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In the post 9/11 environment nation building is often viewed as an anti-terrorism tool. 
This thesis examines post 9/11 nation building with a focus on 1) whether nation building 
secures a lasting victory against anti-American terrorism, 2) how skilled is the U.S. 
military to lead nation building missions, and 3) which government model, centralized or 
decentralized, is most likely to result in a sustainable Afghan state. In doing so, it first 
evaluates the notion that promoting democracy through nation building in failed states 
will secure a lasting victory against anti-American terrorism. The focus then shifts to the 
military’s skills in the areas of democratization and economic development by discussing 
the military’s contributions to the success achieved, or the lack of success, in the missions 
in Germany and Japan at the end of the Second World War, and more recently in Iraq. 
Finally, to examine which government model is most likely to result in a sustainable 
Afghan state, the thesis discusses the inability of the central government to extend its 
reach to the periphery and guarantee security in the context of the complex history of 
Afghanistan.  The thesis concludes that failed states will continue to present a security 
danger in the next several decades. Thus, nation building will remain a relevant tool in 
reducing opportunities for terrorist organizations. Only an appropriate mix of military and 
civilian agencies, rather than the military taking the lead in all aspects of nation building, 
can result in a lasting success, namely a sustainable democratic state. The thesis makes it 
clear that the proper model for a sustainable Afghan state is a flexible centralized model 
that allows division of responsibilities between the center and the periphery. 
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The United States has amassed extensive experience in nation building prior to 9/11. 
Following the end of the Cold War, the United States has intervened approximately once 
every two years compared to about once every decade during the Cold War. While the 
U.S. interventions during the Cold War were designed to complement the policy of 
containment through regime changes, post-Cold War missions focused on building 
democratic governments. At the same time, the duration of these missions has increased 
to up to ten years. The U.S.-led operations have also become more ambitious in scope. 
While the goal used to be separation of warring factions, policing demilitarized zones, 
and monitoring ceasefires, the goals of today’s missions include reuniting divided 
societies, disarming adversaries, demobilizing former combatants, organizing elections, 
installing representative governments, and promoting democratic reform and economic 
growth.1  
 
After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, nation building acquired a new 
dimension. It evolved from being a tool used in achieving humanitarian and development 
objectives to becoming a principal tool in combating terrorism. Nation building missions 
in Afghanistan and Iraq conducted after 9/11 are the most ambitious post-Cold War 
engagements. The United States undertook occupation of two countries simultaneously 
with the goal of transforming them into functioning democracies and, consequently, 
eradicating terrorism.  
                                                 
1 Dobbins James, John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel M. 
Swanger and Anga R. Timilsina. America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq. Santa Monica, 





Despite its long track record in nation building, the United States has viewed every 
mission of the past, including post 9/11 missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, as an anomaly 
not likely to be repeated in the future. As a result, there has been no significant effort to 
consolidate knowledge and build an effective nation building apparatus. As the United 
States is set to withdraw most of its troops from Afghanistan at the end of 2014, the 
future of nation building in the wider U.S. strategy remains unclear.  
 
Nation building has always been a highly polarizing and contentious topic both among 
policy makers and the American public. Considering that nation building missions are 
prolonged endeavors that come with casualties and high costs, no policy maker wants to 
be seen as putting the U.S. military at risk and wasting the taxpayers’ money. 
Additionally, nation building missions come with no guarantees for success as the host 
countries have a natural tendency to resist solutions imposed by outsiders, even when 
interventions are supported by reputable international organizations, such as the United 
Nations. Those who oppose nation building often claim that achieving success is close to 
impossible; they characterize nation building as a “fool’s errand.”2   
 
Nation building is a complex and multidimensional research topic. This thesis portfolio 
examines one specific aspect of each of the following three broad areas in the context of 
post 9/11 nation building missions: 1) the relevance of nation building for the United 
States’ national security, 2) the role of the military, and 3) the viability of achieving the 
                                                 
2 Dempsey, Gary. “Fool's Errands: America's Recent Encounters with Nation Building.” Mediterranean 




ultimate goal of nation building, namely a stable and self-sustainable democratic state. In 
the first area, the research focuses on whether nation building presents a long-term 
solution to the anti-American terrorism.  In the second area, this thesis examines the role 
of the military by looking at the military’s leadership in the reconstruction phase of the 
past and present nation building missions. Afghanistan is the longest and arguably the 
most consequential nation building mission since the end of the Cold War. Hence, in an 
effort to challenge the hypothesis that nation building is a “fool’s errand,” the thesis 
discusses the appropriate state model for the new Afghan state.   
 
The first chapter explores whether nation building presents a long-term solution to the 
anti-American terrorism post 9/11. It examines the history of the United States’ anti-
terrorism policy in order to explain post 9/11 nation building. The debate whether failed 
states serve as terrorist safe havens is central when discussing the relevance of nation 
building as an anti-terrorism tool. Therefore, this chapter contrasts the views of 
proponents and critics of the idea that the way to combat terrorism is to promote 
democracy through nation building in failed states by reviewing official documents and 
statements, scholarly analysis, and news reports.  The chapter discusses the Afghanistan 
experience to examine the rationale for using nation building as an anti-terrorism tool as 
well as the prospective for securing a long-term victory. The discussion than turns to the 
problem of sustainability of an anti-terrorism strategy that is centered on nation building 
when faced with declining public support and mounting costs. The main finding in this 
chapter is that, even though terrorism is not a concern in majority of failed states, failed 




democracies are less likely to produce terrorists than any other regime type. Therefore, 
building democracies in failed states has a potential of providing a permanent solution to 
terrorism. This chapter recommends consolidating knowledge and fixing the nation 
building system so it can effectively address the security danger presented by failed 
states. 
 
The second chapter examines whether the U.S. military has the skills to take the lead in 
post 9/11 nation building. Specifically, the focus in this chapter is on military leadership 
in the areas traditionally managed by civilian agencies, such as democratization and 
economic development. The chapter starts with an attempt to highlight the policy 
decisions that resulted in the military taking the lead in the post 9/11 nation building 
missions. The chapter examines how the success achieved, or the lack of success, in 
democratization and economic development in Germany and Japan after the end of the 
Second World War and in Iraq post 9/11 illustrates the military’s nation building skills. 
The focus then shifts to recent changes in the military’s doctrine and examines the 
soldiers’ attitudes toward nation building in an attempt to identify whether the military is 
ready to embrace nation building as one of its core duties. Finally, the chapter discusses 
the implications of using the military as the main tool in nation building for the wider 
U.S. foreign policy goals and combat readiness. The main finding is that the military is 
skilled enough to lead missions limited to “state building” but not missions that also 
include the “nation building” element. Post-Cold War and post 9/11 missions indicate 
that the military is neither resourced nor trained to lead the efforts in the areas of 




which is providing security. The chapter upholds that only an appropriate mix of military 
and civilian agencies, rather than the military taking the lead in all aspects of nation 
building, can result in a success, namely a sustainable democratic state.  
 
The third chapter examines which government model, centralized or decentralized, is 
most likely to result in a sustainable Afghan state. The chapter focuses on two areas that 
are arguably most consequential for the sustainability of the new Afghan state. The first 
area is the inability of the central government to extend its reach and establish authority 
among tribes living in rural areas.  Therefore, this chapter examines tribalism in 
Afghanistan in order to identify solutions to the historically dysfunctional relationship 
between the central government and the periphery.  The chapter presents challenges that 
Great Britain and the Soviet Union faced in bringing the Pashtun tribes under central rule 
in an effort to identify lessons that can be applied to today’s interactions with the tribes. 
The second area examined is the fragile security situation. Arbakai networks offer a solid 
case study when examining whether local structures can assist in maintaining security. 
The discussion than turns to current developments in the area of governance and whether 
the current highly centralized model is functioning in Afghanistan.  The main finding is 
that a plausible solution for Afghanistan is a flexible centralized government model that 
allows division of responsibilities between the center and the periphery. This chapter 
concludes that a functional local government system that is built ground-up and engaged 






Nation Building as an Anti-terrorism Tool  
 
Nation-building missions in Afghanistan and Iraq are the most ambitious post-Cold War 
U.S.-led operations. In December 2011, as the final U.S. troops withdrew from Iraq, 
President Obama declared Iraq a success. The President said, "Iraq is not a perfect place. 
It has many challenges ahead. But we are leaving behind a sovereign, stable and self-
reliant Iraq with a representative government that was elected by its people.”3 Many 
disagree with President Obama’s statement that Iraq is a success and it remains to be seen 
if Iraq will continue to develop as a democracy or disintegrate and serve as a launching 
pad for terrorist attacks. While the terms and ratification of the Bilateral Security 
Agreement (BSA) between the United States and Afghanistan, which will govern the 
U.S. presence in Afghanistan in the next decade, are still being negotiated, it is evident 
that the United States will withdraw the majority of its forces from Afghanistan by the 
end of 2014. It is unclear whether the young Afghan government will be able to counter 
the resurgence of Taliban and al Qaeda once the U.S. troops leave the country.  
This chapter examines whether nation building presents a long-term solution to the           
anti-American terrorism post 9/11. The notion that nation building is the only solution for 
ensuring a lasting victory against terrorists has been a principal premise in the United 
States’ anti-terrorism policy since September 11. After September 11, nation building has 
become, as described by some scholars, “securitized” – nation building has evolved from 
                                                 





being a tool in achieving humanitarian and development objectives to becoming a 
principal tool in combating terrorism.4  
This chapter starts with an attempt to define nation building as it relates to post-conflict 
interventions and a brief examination of the history of the United States’ anti-terrorism 
policy in order to explain the securitization of nation building post 9/11.  The debate 
whether failed states serve as terrorist safe havens and whether democratization leads to 
reduction in terrorism is central when discussing the relevance of nation building as an 
anti-terrorism tool. Thus, this chapter contrasts the views of the proponents and critics of 
the idea that the way to combat terrorism is to promote democracy through nation 
building in failed states.  The discussion then turns to the problem of sustainability of an 
anti-terrorism strategy that is centered on nation building by examining public support 
and costs. The nation building experience in Afghanistan post 9/11 offers a solid case 
study as it exemplifies whether lasting results can be achieved through nation building as 
well as challenges in securing a long-term victory. Finally, this chapter offers 
recommendations on the extent to which nation building should be included in the U.S. 
anti-terrorism strategy. 
 
Nation Building Defined 
 
In the United States’ political discourse the term “nation building” is very often used 
interchangeably with the term “state building.” Furthermore, President Obama, in order 
                                                 
4 Menkhaus, Ken. “Quasi-States, Nation-Building, and Terrorist Safe Havens.” Journal of Conflict Studies, 





to underline the need to refocus resources on domestic issues, called for “nation building 
at home” in his 2012 state of the union speech.5 It appears that “nation building” has 
become a political buzzword applicable to any and all reconstruction efforts at home and 
abroad.  
 
It is important to note that, although the term nation building is used extensively in the 
news media and policy discussions, a clear and universally accepted definition of nation 
building in the context of foreign interventions has not emerged. Administrations leading 
various overseas operations each had a preferred terminology. For instance, the post-Cold 
War operations in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia were generally termed peacebuilding 
missions while the Bush administration preferred the term stabilization and 
reconstruction to refer to its post-conflict operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, 
all these missions had the same goal - building a stable society through democratization 
with the help of military force. Some analysts use the term “nation building” to describe 
all reconstruction efforts after the end of the Second World War. While there appears to 
be a basic understanding, at least in the political discourse in the United States, that the 
difference between the terms such as peacebuilding, nation building, and state building is 
mostly terminological, some argue that the difference is fundamental. 6 
 
The term “peacebuilding” is the term preferred by the United Nations and has been used 
to describe international interventions in the Balkans in the 1990s. In 2007, the UN 
                                                 
5 The White House. 2012 State of the Union. January 25, 2012 http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-
video/video/2012/01/25/2012-state-union-address-enhanced-version#transcript  
6 Dobbins, James., McGinn, John G., Crane, Keith., Jones, Seth G., Lal, Rollie., Rathmell, Andrew., 
Swanger, Rachel M., and Timilsina, Anga R. “America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq.” 




Secretary-General's Policy Committee defined peacebuilding as a set of measures 
“targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national 
capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable 
peace and development.”7  
 
The terms “state building” and “nation building” are representative of the terminology 
used in the United States’ academic and political discourse to describe post 9/11 missions 
in Afghanistan and Iraq. Therefore, when attempting to define nation building it is 
important to examine whether state building is synonymous to nation building. Report 
entitled The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building, defines nation building as “the use of 
armed force as part of a broader effort to promote political and economic reforms with 
the objective of transforming a society emerging from conflict into one at peace with 
itself and its neighbors.”8 Authors of an article published in Max Planck Yearbook of 
United Nations Law take issue with this definition as it focuses on state, rather than 
nation.9  
 
Political scientists draw a clear distinction between state failure and nation failure and 
maintain that the two phenomena are not always mutually inclusive.  State failure can be 
defined as “the failure of public institutions to deliver positive political goods to citizens 
                                                 
7 United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office. United Nations. 
<http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pbun.shtml> 
8 Dobbins, James., Jones, Seth G., Crane, Keith., and Cole DeGrasse, Beth. “The Beginner’s Guide to 
Nation-Building.” Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007. 
<http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG557.> 
9 Von Bogdandy, Armin., Häußler, Stefan., Hanschmann, Felix., and Utz, Raphael. “State-Building, 
Nation-Building, and Constitutional Politics in Post-Conflict Situations: Conceptual Clarifications and an 





on a scale likely to undermine the legitimacy and the existence of the state itself.”10 On 
the other hand, the most important indicator of nation failure is people’s rejection of 
government as a legitimate source of power. In a democratic society, government 
legitimacy stems from the notion that government represents the people and that 
government and the people are united in the same purpose. Nation failure ensues when 
people consider the existing government illegitimate and when “nationhood no longer 
provides the foundation of accepted public power.”11 Very often state failure in 
multiethnic states is accompanied by nation failure exemplified in rejection of common 
history, traditions, and customs. As history shows, collapse of state and national identity 
crisis can easily lead into civil war. The war in the Balkans in the 1990s is an illustrative 
example. The collapse of often disputed Yugoslavian identity of over forty years was 
followed by re-emergence of national identity, Croatian and Serbian for instance. It gave 
way to the rise of militant elites who instilled fear and the need for self-defense and fight 
for survival in their respective communities.  These are usually pre-conditions for 
violence and civil war.12  
 
State building can be broadly defined as “establishment, re-establishment, and 
strengthening of a public structure in a given territory capable of delivering public 
goods.”13 Nation building aims to construct a national identity based on common 
traditions, institutions, and history for the purpose of legitimizing state structure. Hence, 








nation building can be defined as a “process of collective identity formation with a view 
to legitimizing public power within a given territory.”14  
 
It is evident that there are fundamental differences between the terms “state building” and 
“nation building.” They describe two very different, although often overlapping, 
phenomena and it is not always appropriate to use the terms interchangeably. However, 
for the purpose of this research, considering that the missions examined are cases of state 
failure aggravated by nation failure and “nation building” is the term used in academic 
articles discussed, broadening the definition of nation building to include elements of 
state building, namely political and economic reforms, is appropriate.  
 
Stopping Terrorism: From Containment to Nation Building 
 
The United States’ anti-terrorism policy from the 1970s to the 1990s is typically viewed 
as a policy of containment as it mainly focused on deterring and punishing state sponsors 
of terrorist networks.15 The main rationale for the containment policy is best illustrated in 
the words of the former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger who wrote that, 
“Governments on whose territory terrorists are tolerated will find it especially difficult to 
cooperate [with the United States] unless the consequences of failing to do so are made 
more risky than their tacit bargain with the terrorists.”16  
                                                 
14 Ibid 
15 Perl, Raphael. “Terrorism and National Security: Issues and Trends.” Congressional Research Service. 
December 21, 2004. < http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/IB10119.pdf> 
16 Dempsey, Gary T. “Old Folly in a New Disguise: Nation Building to Combat Terrorism.” Cato Institute 




Following the September 11 attacks, the policy of containment was quickly replaced by 
the policy of preemption, which is generally referred to as the “Bush Doctrine.” The Bush 
Administration decided that the United States should take a proactive role in stopping 
anti-American terrorism rather than act only after attacks occur. The main effect of 
September 11 was evident immediately following the attacks; combating Islamic 
terrorism, with the focus on dismantling al Qaeda, became the top national priority. In 
order to achieve that goal, the Bush administration approved a preemptive use of force 
against not only terrorist groups and infrastructure but also state sponsors of terrorist 
networks.17 As a result, the nation building missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, a natural 
progression after toppling the Taliban and Saddam Hussein, were viewed as the means 
for preventing terrorism.  
One illustrative example of how central nation building has become in protecting 
America's national security interests is the remarkable attitude change on the issue by 
President G.W. Bush. Candidate G.W. Bush opposed nation building and stated that the 
United States’ military should not be used “for what is called nation building.”18 
However, following the attacks on September 11, President Bush asserted that the success 
in Iraq was paramount and that, "Rebuilding Iraq will require a sustained commitment 
from many nations, including our own. We will remain in Iraq as long as necessary, and 
not a day more."19 Published in the aftermath of the attacks on September 11, President 
Bush's National Security Strategy is heavily focused on failed and weak states as well as 
spreading democracy across the globe. The document states that the United States will 
                                                 
17 Perl, 2004.  
18 Fukuyama, Francis. “Nation-building 101.” The Atlantic Monthly. January/February 2004,Volume 293, 





“actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade 
to every corner of the world.” 20 It further asserts that, “In an increasingly interconnected 
world, regional crisis can strain our alliances, rekindle rivalries among the major powers, 
and create horrifying affronts to human dignity.”21 In his national security strategy, 
President Bush made a pledge that he would remain committed to resolving the issue of 
weak states.  
 
Even though President Obama campaigned on ending the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
his National Security Strategy published in 2010 identified failed states as one of the 
main dangers for the American national security in the decades to follow. President 
Obama's National Security states that, “Failing states breed conflict and endanger 
regional and global security.” 22 The document further asserts that, “The United States 
and the international community cannot shy away from the difficult task of pursuing 
stabilization in conflict and post-conflict environments.”23 Obama's strategy includes 
anticipating and preventing security challenges. Obama states that the goal is to 
“diminish military risk, act before crises and conflicts erupt, and ensure that governments 
are better able to serve their people.”24  
 
The United Nations (UN) shares the belief that nation building plays a vital role in 
ensuring global stability and has made changes to its Charter to legitimize future 
missions. A UN report published in 2000, which outlines the UN reforms and is often 
                                                 
20 The National Security Strategy of the United States. September 2002. 
21 Ibid 






referred to as the Brahimi Report, dedicates significant space to developing strategies to 
promote effective governance in post-conflict states. The United Nations held a long-
standing view that all foreign military interventions including nation building must be in 
accordance with international law, which holds in high regard the principle of state 
sovereignty and the norm of nonintervention. According to the article 2[4] of the UN 
Charter, no state can interfere in the domestic affairs of another state except in self-
defense or unless mandated by the United Nations. However, in 2005 the United Nations 
adopted the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, which states that, if a sovereign 
state is unable or unwilling to protect its citizens, the international community has a 
responsibility to intervene when sanctioned by the Security Council.25  
 
Additionally, key U.S. allies and partners in the fight against terrorism agree that nation 
building will remain relevant and have taken steps to address the danger of terrorism 
emanating from failed states in their national security strategy. Australia appears to have 
taken steps to incorporate nation building into its defense policy traditionally based on 
conflict prevention.  In December 2008, when presenting the first National Security 
Statement, a document equivalent to U.S. National Security Strategy, to the Parliament, 
Prime Minister Kevin Rudd emphasized the importance of regional engagement in 
ensuring Australia’s security. The expectation is that the next National Security 
Statement will include Australia’s nation building strategies for weak states with focus on 
Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific.26 The National Security Strategy document of 
Great Britain published in 2010 states that international terrorism will continue to present 
                                                 
25 Smith, Michael G. and Shrimpton, Rebecca. “Nation-building Interventions and National Security; An 





a challenge and that “fragile, failing and failed states around the world provide the 
environment for terrorists to operate as they look to exploit ungoverned or ill-governed 
space.”27 
 
However, there is still significant resistance towards making nation building a permanent 
part of the U.S. national security strategy. Some analysts believe that continued focus on 
nation building will endanger wider U.S. foreign policy goals. For instance, Justin Logan 
and Christopher Preble believe that most nation building missions are not aligned with 
U.S. national security interests. Nation building missions have vague mandates and can 
tie up American military and financial resources for indefinite periods. Logan and Preble 
state that incorporating nation building into national security strategy “is a recipe for 
squandering American power, American money, and potentially American lives.” 28  
 
Exploring the Link Between Failed States, Terrorism, and Democratization  
 
The securitization of nation building has resulted in an increased focus on failed states. It 
is evident that the relevance of nation building as an anti-terrorism tool hinges on whether 
weak and failed states serve as terrorist safe havens.  Many analysts and policy makers 
operate under a broad definition of failed states and argue that failed states will remain a 
threat in the foreseeable future and that promoting democracy, strengthening the rule of 
law, and building state institutions is the best approach to ensure global stability. 
                                                 
27 A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy. October 2010. 
<http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_
191639.pdf> 
28 Logan, Justin., Preble, Christopher. “Failed States and Flawed Logic, The Case against a Standing 




Opponents of this view argue that instances where failed states present a threat to the 
U.S. national security are rare and that focusing resources on repairing every failed state 
is a mistake. They also argue that democratization, as the mail goal of U.S-led nation 
building missions, does not necessarily lead to reduction in terrorism.  
a) Is Terrorism a Problem in Failed States?  
 
Francis Fukuyama argues that the main threat for the security of the United States and the 
wider international community in the century ahead is weak, collapsed or failed states. 
Weak or non-existent government institutions create opportunities for the raise of 
terrorism. Fukuyama states that learning from past experiences and building political 
support for nation building will be the “defining issue for America in the century 
ahead.”29 Directly linked to the problem of weak and failing states is the danger 
represented by ungoverned spaces, areas located within the borders of a state but beyond 
the state’s authority and control.  According to the Strategic Global Assessment published 
by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, there is a direct link between ungoverned 
spaces and terrorist attacks on a global scale. In today’s globalized world, terrorist groups 
can take full advantage of modern technology and use ungoverned spaces to organize, 
plan, and launch operations of unprecedented reach and proportions. For instance, 
ungoverned areas along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border have long served as terrorist 
safe havens.  In 2006, terrorists operating in this area planned an attack that would have 
destroyed seven transatlantic airplanes. British police managed to disrupt the attack 
                                                 




before it was carried out. This same area has been the launching pad for terrorist attacks 
against the U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan and suicide bombings in Pakistan.30 
 
The view that failing states present an imminent security danger is widespread and has 
led to a number of projects in recent years focused on identifying the likelihood of state 
failures. For instance, the Fund for Peace produces an annual Failed States Index (FSI) 
that ranks the likelihood of a state failure based on social, economic, political, and 
military indicators. The Index is based on The Fund for Peace’s proprietary Conflict 
Assessment Software Tool (CAST) analytical platform. The index is predicated on the 
belief that weak and failing states pose a challenge to the international community and 
that one state’s failure can negatively affect its neighbors as well as other states in remote 
regions. That has been the case with states like Somalia, Libya, Yemen, Haiti, and 
Bosnia. The 2012 Failed States Index sounds the alarm for Somalia and Yemen, countries 
that have been linked to the United States national security as they are often considered to 
be terrorists’ safe havens.31  
 
Some analysts question the link between failed states and terrorism and argue that 
terrorism is not a concern in the majority of failed states. The List of Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations (FTO) published by the U.S. Secretary of State is regarded as one of the 
most reliable lists of terrorist organizations that pose a security risk.  When compared to 
FTO, twenty states listed on the 2006 Failed State Index as most likely to fail appear to 
pose no significant security threat.  Aidan Hehir argues that states listed on the Failed 
                                                 
30 Cronin, Patrick M. “Global Strategic Assessment 2009: America’s Security Role in a Changing World.” 
Institute for National Strategic Studies. 2009. 




State Index as most likely to fail would have to host a significant number of FTOs if 
indeed failing states are terrorist breeding grounds.  However, only Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
Pakistan exhibit a marked presence of FTOs while the remaining thirteen listed on the 
Failed State Index as most likely to fail have no presence of FTOs.  States that ranked 
low on the Failed State Index, for instance India, Lebanon, Israel, and the Philippines, are 
in fact the states with the highest presence of FTOs.  Therefore, Hehir concludes that 
there is no correlation between a state’s failure and the number of FTOs operating within 
its territory.32 
Dempsey argues that failed states do not necessarily present safe havens for terrorists as 
“failed states are where the terrorists are most vulnerable to covert action, commando 
raids, surprise attacks, and local informants willing to work for a few dollars.”33 Instead 
of pouring resources into nation building, he suggests a “realist perspective” which 
focuses on credible deterrence. Dempsey states that the most effective way to prevent 
terrorism is to discourage countries sponsors of terrorism by imposing a significant cost 
for supporting terrorist networks. Dempsey is not concerned about ungoverned areas 
either as he sees the lack of competent government as an advantage for the United States. 
Ungoverned areas are where the terrorists are most vulnerable because there is no 
legitimate power to protect them.34  
Ken Menkhaus agrees that terrorists consider failed states to be a relatively inhospitable 
territory. In the aftermath of 9/11, Somalia has been often discussed as a possible next 
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nation building mission. At first glance, Somalia seems like a logical next target. Somalia 
is clearly a failed state as the current government is completely ineffective. It is also a 
country with an active terrorist presence in the form of the radical Islamist group al-
Ittihad al-Islamiyya (AIAI). However, even though Somalia has been described as a 
potential terrorist base for al Qaeda, there appears to be little evidence that there are 
credible terrorist targets in the country. The fact that al Qaeda has not established the kind 
of presence that would warrant a large scale military occupation might suggest that failed 
states are not necessarily viewed by terrorists as potential safe havens.35 However, 
Menkhaus does note that failed states are not terrorist free as the evidence suggests that 
terrorist networks find failed states to be useful for easy movement of men, money, and 
material into the neighboring countries as is currently evident in the Horn of Africa. 36   
Menkhaus warns about the consequences of false linkage between failed states and 
terrorism and argues that current nation building practices do not eliminate terrorist threat 
and can have a counter effect. He also warns about a “security paradox” of nation 
building. During the transitional stage of nation building, the lengthy time period between 
state collapse and a fully effective new government, the state is sovereign but weak and 
corrupt, the condition he describes as a quasi state. Terrorist networks will use quasi 
states for their bases as corruption among police border guards and airport officials 
allows them to circumvent the law while at the same time enjoying protection from an 
international intervention. For instance, it is widely suspected that the suspect in the 
December 2002 terrorist attack in Mombasa, Kenya escaped by bribing the police. 37 
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Another important consideration when discussing nation building as an anti-terrorism 
tool is the U.S. military being used by local power holders to advance their agenda. 
History shows that competing factions will attempt to use the U.S. military as a power 
grabbing tool. This phenomenon has been noted in Afghanistan. In December 2001, the 
U.S. air force attacked a convoy on a road in Paktia province after the U.S. military was 
tipped off that Taliban officials were traveling in the convoy. More than fifty people died 
in the attack. The information revealed in the aftermath of the attack made it clear that the 
U.S. was used in a local power struggle. The investigation uncovered that the convoy was 
mostly made up of tribal elders and that some Taliban were indeed travelling in the 
convoy. However, those were former Taliban who had switched sides when it became 
clear that the U.S. was winning. All indications were that the U.S. informant wanted to 
eliminate somebody in the convoy and misled the U.S. military in order to accomplish his 
agenda. This phenomenon is likely to repeat in other missions as well. In Somalia, often 
discussed in the context of terrorist safe haven and failed states, three warlords were 
calling on the United States to intervene militarily and politically in 2002 in order to 
prevent further rise of terrorism. However, a closer inspection reveals that their main 
motivation was to topple a weak government and they were hoping that the U.S. would 
do that on their behalf if terrorism were included in the mix. Dempsey quotes a U.S. 
official familiar with Somalia as saying that, “The new game in town is to call your 
enemy a terrorist and hope that America will destroy him for you.”38 
                                                 




b) Does Democratization Through Nation Building Prevent Terrorism?   
 
The post-Cold War and post 9/11 nation building missions, for instance in Bosnia, 
Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, evidence that the main goal of the U.S-led nation 
building is democratization. The view that spreading democracy will advance the U.S. 
national security by preventing the rise of terrorism has been the main premise of the 
U.S. anti-terrorism strategy post 9/11. President Bush was clear that replacing 
dictatorships with democratic governments is essential in stopping terrorism. President 
Bush stated that, "When a dictatorship controls the political life of a country, responsible 
opposition cannot develop, and dissent is driven underground and toward the extreme. 
And to draw attention away from their social and economic failures, dictators place 
blame on other countries and other races, and stir the hatred that leads to violence. This 
status quo of despotism and anger cannot be ignored or appeased, kept in a box or bought 
off."39 
The 2006 U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism illustrates the type of 
reasoning that leads to the conclusion that democratization is the only long-term solution 
to terrorism. The strategy states that, “The long-term solution for winning the War on 
Terror is the advancement of freedom and human dignity through effective democracy.”40 
It further states that the “War on Terror” is both a “battle of arms and a battle of ideas.”41 
Hence, promoting democratic values is as important as defeating the terrorists on the 
battlefield. The cause of anti-American terrorism in the broader Middle East is not 
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poverty, the U.S. policies regarding the Israeli-Palestinian issue, or recent military actions 
aimed at preventing terrorist attacks. For instance, al Qaeda targeted the United States 
long before the United States invaded Afghanistan and Iraq. Instead, terrorism rises from 
political isolation and mounting grievances. The main view is that democracy, because it 
is based on empowerment and expansion of liberties for the entire population, “offers an 
ownership stake in society, a chance to shape one’s own future.”42 Democratization 
addresses the real cause of terrorism because it resolves grievances by instituting “the 
rule of law, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and the habits of advancing interests 
through compromise.”43 
The voices that question the view that democratization will prevent terrorism have been 
growing stronger in light of the slow progress in Iraq and Afghanistan and they are 
reflected in President Obama’s 2011 anti-terrorism strategy. Obama’s strategy is focused 
on practical steps in stopping al Qaeda and its affiliates and building international 
alliances rather than taking concrete steps to build democracies.44 In President Obama’s 
strategy, the focus shifts from actively building democracies to merely supporting “the 
rights of free speech, assembly, and democracy.”45  
It is plausible to argue that there is no evidence to support the premise that 
democratization will stop terrorism. Gregory F. Gause questions the link between 
terrorism and the form of government. 46 He states that empirical data does not indicate 
that there is a link between the number of terrorist attacks and the form of government. 
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For instance, there is no evidence that democracies are less likely to experience terrorist 
attacks than autocracies. He points to the State Department's annual Patterns of Global 
Terrorism report that indicates that “between 2000 and 2003, 269 major terrorist 
incidents around the world occurred in countries classified as "free" by Freedom House, 
119 occurred in "partly free" countries, and 138 occurred in "not free" countries.”47 
Additionally, proponents of this view emphasize that even developed democracies are not 
immune to terrorism. It is evident that al Qaeda operates from Germany, Great Britain, 
Canada, and other stable democratic countries.48   
However, Shadi Hamid and Steven Brooke argue that, in order to answer whether 
democratization prevents terrorism, the focus should be on which countries produce 
terrorists rather than which countries experience terrorist attacks. They argue that the 
focus should not be on where terrorists operate; they concede that democracies, such as 
the United States and Britain, are frequent targets of terrorism. Hamid and Brooke 
advance their “tyranny-terror” hypothesis and examine which regime types are most 
likely to produce terrorists. Therefore, they suggest examining the terrorists’ country of 
origin rather than where they operate or which countries are their targets.49 
 
A 2005 study published by the Freedom House offers numbers that confirm the link 
between autocracy and terrorism. The study found that, “Between 1999 and 2003, 70 
percent of all deaths from terrorism were caused by terrorists and terrorist groups 
originating in Not Free societies, while only 8 percent of all fatalities were generated by 
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terrorists and terror movements with origins in Free societies.”50 Additionally, the attacks 
by terrorists originating from “not free” societies were more deadly when compared to 
the attacks by terrorists originating from “free” societies.51 This study certainly supports 
the conclusion that spreading democracy is likely to enhance the U.S. national security 
because democracies are significantly less likely to produce terrorists. Furthermore, 
democratic states will not support terrorist acts against the United States. The world's 
principal sponsors of international terrorism are harsh, authoritarian regimes, including 
Iran, North Korea, and Sudan.52  
 
 
Afghanistan Case Study  
 
Afghanistan is often described as an example of a failed state serving as a terrorist safe 
haven and it is often argued that the failure to intervene in Afghanistan after the Soviet 
withdrawal in the 1980s directly jeopardized the United States’ security. As the United 
States troops are pulling out of Afghanistan, the time has come to evaluate whether the 
nation building mission in Afghanistan that has lasted for over a decade and came with a 
high price tag in both casualties and treasure resulted in a functional Afghan state that 
will no longer serve as a terrorist safe heaven.  
 
Even though the goals of the United States strategy in Afghanistan have not always been 
clear and specific, it is evident that winning the “war on terror,” specifically dismantling 
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al Qaeda and removing the Taliban from power, has always been the main objective. In 
the immediate aftermath of September 11, the goals of the Bush Administration’s 
strategy were regime change and dismantling of al Qaeda.  In 2009, President Obama 
declared the main strategic goal in Afghanistan to be the defeat of al Qaeda.53 This case 
study will examine to what extent nation building in Afghanistan achieves long-term 
success in the fight against terrorists. Specifically, this case study examines whether 
nation building in Afghanistan resulted in a stable state that is capable of maintaining the 
advantage over al Qaeda and denying al Qaeda a safe haven in Afghanistan.  
a) Nation Building as an Anti-terrorism Strategy in Afghanistan 
 
Afghanistan has traditionally been a weak state surrounded by hostile neighbors. 
Following the Soviet invasion in 1979, Afghanistan endured a civil war for over twenty 
years. In 1996, after the Soviets withdrew, the Taliban, an Islamic fundamentalist regime, 
established autocracy under Sharia law. Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 
2001, the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) with the goal of 
eradicating al Qaeda from Afghanistan. OEF was launched on October 7, 2001. In a 
matter of weeks, U.S. forces and Northern Alliance, its Afghan ally, captured Kabul. 
Despite speedy military victory, the U.S. faced many difficult challenges in the 
stabilization and reconstruction part of the mission. Afghanistan is a country with no 
national identity and no tradition of a strong central government. It is ruled by tribalism, 
lawlessness, and ethnic disputes. 54  
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The Bush administration’s early anti-terrorism strategy is illustrated in a memo from the 
Department of Defense under Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to President Bush in which 
Rumsfeld suggests an expansive military response. Rumsfeld argued that limiting the 
U.S. response to capturing terrorists hiding in “the caves of Afghanistan" is not the most 
effective option; he stated that the U.S. should use its military might to effect regime 
change in “Afghanistan and another key State (or two) that supports terrorism to 
strengthen political and military efforts to change policies elsewhere."55 However, a 
prolonged nation building mission in Afghanistan was not a part of the Bush 
Administration’s initial strategy. The United States initially tried to keep a small footprint 
in Afghanistan. The National Security Council's outline of the White House strategy to 
destroy the Taliban and al Qaeda dated October 16, 2001 warns against large-scale nation 
building efforts. The document states that, "The U.S. should not commit to any post-
Taliban military involvement since the U.S. will be heavily engaged in the anti-terrorism 
effort worldwide."56 
Nevertheless, soon after Taliban was ousted it became clear that the White House 
strategy had to include expansive nation building efforts in order to achieve a lasting 
success. It was clear that the military victory would be only temporary as the danger of 
Taliban returning to power and providing a sanctuary for al Qaeda as soon as the U.S. 
troops left Afghanistan was evident from the beginning. Ambassador Neumann warned in 
2006 that the American failure to seriously engage in nation building in Afghanistan 
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would jeopardize the mission and benefit Taliban. 57 Therefore, without successful nation 
building there would be no eradication of the anti-American terrorist networks in the 
region.  
The U.S. military eventually moved toward a strategy focused on winning over the 
people of Afghanistan and assisting them in building the Afghan nation. Nation building 
became a crucial part of the strategy in Afghanistan with the introduction of a freshly 
updated Counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine, which was the main feature of the troop 
surge in 2009. Facing slow progress in fighting insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan, the 
military updated and codified the COIN doctrine in Field Manual 3-24, jointly published 
by the U.S. Army and the Marines in 2006. 58 COIN is a “population-centric” 
counterinsurgency.59 COIN recognizes that war is won by political rather than military 
victories and suggests that the focus should be on “winning hearts and minds” and 
limiting the influence of insurgents amongst the population. The implementation of 
COIN clearly indicates that the military recognized that a “shock-and-awe” campaign 
that was successful in bringing down Taliban and Saddam Hussein was not effective in 
the reconstruction phase. 60  
Critics of the nation building efforts in Afghanistan have long contended that deploying 
American troops in Afghanistan and attempting to rebuild the Afghan society was 
unnecessary and unwise. Dempsey warns that, “The security of the United States does 
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not require a multiethnic, liberal democracy in Afghanistan.”61 Nation building is not a 
smart strategy as it puts American lives on the line; American soldiers and civilian 
personnel on the ground in Afghanistan present convenient targets for terrorists. 
Additionally, nation building is not a sustainable strategy as high cost and casualties can 
erode public support for the mission and jeopardize the success of the larger anti-
terrorism effort.62  
Dempsey also argues that nation building is in effect meddling into internal politics and 
that it was precisely the external meddling that resulted in the emergence of Taliban. 
Dempsey describes Afghanistan as a relatively stable country in the period from 1930 to 
1978. Soviets’ efforts to bring the Afghan communists into power disturbed the internal 
balance and resulted in a prolong civil war. The era of Soviet meddling was followed by 
the United States’ policy of supporting the most extreme anti-Soviet and anti-modern 
elements. Finally, Pakistan’s internal security services supported the Taliban as it was 
Pakistan’s belief that the Taliban was best positioned to help secure Islamabad’s strategic 
interests in the region. Dempsey concludes that, “The lesson of Afghanistan is not that 
there hasn’t been enough outside meddling but that there has been too much.63 
b) Evaluating Results   
 
It is evident that al Qaeda has suffered a deadly blow as a result of the U.S. engagement 
in Afghanistan; most of the leadership has been killed or captured including Osama bin 
Laden. Leon Panetta, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency at the time, stated that 
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al Qaeda had a relatively small presence in Afghanistan in 2010 and estimated that, 
"We're looking at maybe 50 to 100, maybe less.” 64 Panetta echoed that winning in 
Afghanistan means "having a country that is stable enough to ensure that there is no safe 
haven for al Qaeda or for a militant Taliban that welcomes al Qaeda." 65  Therefore, the 
success in building the Afghan state will determine whether the gains against terrorists 
will be maintained after the U.S. troops leave the country. The long-term success against 
al Qaeda will hinge on the ability of the new Afghan state to prevent resurgence of 
Taliban and al Qaeda.   
 
In the Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan published in 
November 2013, the Department of Defense offers evidence that the young Afghan state 
has a potential to prevent resurgence of Taliban and al Qaeda. According to the report, 
the newly established government in Kabul has gained control of the majority of the 
country. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), a security force that includes 
armed forces and local, national, and border police, assumed the responsibility for 
security nationwide as of June 2013. The ANSF has shown ability to conduct security 
operations independently and has demonstrated the capability to engage insurgents what 
resulted in reduction of the number of security incidents compared to 2012. The report 
notes that the ANSF has a tactical advantage over the Taliban and that Afghans have 
positive perceptions of the ANSF. Additionally, despite many setbacks the ANSF has 
nearly doubled in size since 2009. Nevertheless, the report does question the 
sustainability of these encouraging results without significant long-term financial and 
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The DOD report also states that the Afghan government’s ability to deliver basic services 
to its people has been significantly improved when compared to previous years. 
However, the report emphasizes that the high level of government corruption and 
inability to extend its influence to rural areas could eventually undermine the country’s 
stability. Corruption has been a difficult obstacle in establishing security and the rule of 
law as corrupt government officials are often linked to criminal and insurgent networks.67 
 
It is undisputable that a significant progress has been made in building a sustainable 
Afghan state that makes is more difficult, although not impossible, for al Qaeda to 
operate.  However, there is a lot of skepticism that the gains can be maintained without a 
continued strong U.S. military presence on the ground. According to the news reports, a 
significant number of the U.S. national security officials and policy makers express a 
bleak outlook for Afghanistan. The Washington Post reports that unnamed policy makers 
familiar with the National Intelligence Estimate, a classified document that includes input 
from sixteen intelligence agencies and is produced by the National Intelligence Council 
for the benefit of the policy makers, state that the report foresees reemergence of Taliban 
as the United States withdraws its troops. The new assessments predict that the gains will 
be eroded by 2017 even if the U.S. maintains a modest military presence beyond 2014 
                                                 






and continues to provide financial support to the Afghan government.68 Nasir Shansab, a 
former Afghani industrialist and advisor to the Reagan Administration, stated that 




Public Support and Cost  
 
Nation building is a complex undertaking. The Afghanistan case study clearly indicates 
that nation building is an expensive effort that requires decades of outside assistance to 
ensure lasting results. Therefore, it is important to examine the sustainability of an anti-
terrorism strategy that includes nation building in the context of public support and high 
cost. The United States is generally not willing to commit its military and financial 
resources for an extensive period of time due to domestic politics and concerns about 
casualties. As it was evident in the mission in Somalia in the early 1990s and most 
recently in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. public is particularly sensitive to casualties and 
not likely to support a prolonged intervention that has a high price tag in terms of 
American lives. The decision to withdraw from Somalia in 1995 was influenced to a 
large extent by the horror of the American public after seeing images of U.S. soldiers 
being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. America's adversaries, recognizing their 
weaknesses when faced with the full might of the American military, have tried to 
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capitalize on this sentiment.  Saddam Hussein’s strategy for the Gulf War was to inflict 
high casualties in the hope that the U.S. public would demand withdrawal. He was quoted 
as saying that the United States "does not have the stomach" to fight Iraq. Bosnian Serb 
leader Radovan Karadzic employed a similar strategy to prevent intervention in Bosnia in 
the 1990s. Karadzic stated that the United States and its NATO allies "cannot bear the 
pain" of fighting in Bosnia.70 
 
The American public will likely support a decision to intervene if it believes that vital 
U.S. interests are at stake.  The decision to intervene in Afghanistan enjoyed 
overwhelming public support; the war in Afghanistan was viewed as justified and 
necessary to protect national security. Nevertheless, the initial approval, disregarding 
how high, dwindles in the light of high casualties. Over the duration of the war, the 
public support has deteriorated drastically. In a poll conducted in 2007 only 56 percent 
agreed that the war in Afghanistan has been worth fighting compared to 41 who 
disagreed. In the aftermath of the shooting incident in 2012 in which a U.S. soldier was 
accused of killing Afghan civilians, only 30 percent gave an affirmative response to the 
same question and 66 percent disagreed.71 Similarly, according to the Pew Research 
Center, in March 2003, 72 percent supported the Iraq war. In 2011, the Pew Research 
Center reported that only 48 percent of Americans stated that the United States made the 
right decision to use military force in Iraq, while 46 percent disagreed.72  
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Benjamin Swartz makes an important observation that most polls discussed above ask the 
American public about the initial decision to go into war rather than whether the United 
States should withdraw. He further argues that once involved, even if the cost is high and 
the initial support to intervene declines, the public is more likely to support an escalation 
that will lead to a decisive victory rather than demand immediate withdrawal.  After it 
became clear that the Korean War will be long and costly and public approval decreased 
from 66 percent in August 1950 to only 39 percent in December 1950, only 11 percent of 
polled Americans supported immediate withdrawal. Even as casualties rose to 120,000 
polls showed that only between 12 and 17 percent of the polled public favored speedy 
withdrawal.73 
 
It could be argued that Swartz’s work is dated, having been written in 1994, and limited 
to Korean, Vietnam, and Gulf conflicts. In the light of what appear to be small dividends 
of the post-Cold War interventions, it is plausible to argue that the American public’s 
appetite for a decisive victory even at a high cost has spoiled. The case in point was the 
75 percent approval of President Obama's decision to withdraw nearly all U.S. troops 
from Iraq by the end of 2011.74 However, it is important to note that public support for 
the withdrawal from Iraq was measured after over eight years of heavy military 
engagement and after the security situation in Iraq showed signs of consistent 
improvement. It is also important to stress that 56 percent of Americans agree that the 
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United States has for the most part achieved its goals in Iraq. 75 Therefore, Swartz’s 
conclusion appears to stand the test of time. 
 
The cost of nation building missions is another important factor when discussing public 
support for future missions. Congressional Research Service estimated that the U.S.  
spent almost $802 billion by the end of fiscal year 2011 on funding the war in Iraq. Some 
economists, after taking into account the impact on domestic economy, estimate that the 
cost is close to $3 trillion.76 Getting the support of the U.S. public for yet another nation 
building mission when the country is facing an unprecedented national debt and still 
recovering from the 2008 financial crisis would most certainly be a daunting task.  
 
Post 9/11 Nation Building: Are We Safer Now?  
 
As the Obama Administration is claiming success in Iraq and planning withdrawal of 
combat forces from Afghanistan by the end of 2014, it is still too early to judge the long-
term success of nation building and whether nation building in these two countries 
resulted in a long-term solution to anti-American terrorism. However, currently available 
data, such as the data on the number, deadliness, and concentration of terrorist attacks in 
the period since 9/11 to present, can help paint the picture of more immediate results. The 
data presented in this section can be used to test the correlation between (1) nation 
building and terrorist attacks and (2) failed states and terrorism.  
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According to the report issued by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism (START) Global Terrorism Database (GTD), more than 8,400 
terrorist attacks killing more than 15,400 people were recorded worldwide in 2012. This 
marks a new record for both the number of attacks and the number of fatalities since 
9/11. The previous record year for attacks was 2011 with more than 5,000 incidents. The 
previous record year for fatalities was 2007 with more than 12,500 deaths.77  The terrorist 
attacks in 2012 occurred in 85 countries. However, START data indicates that terrorist 
targets moved to the countries where the U.S. has been engaged in nation building as well 
as surrounding countries, most notably Pakistan. For instance, Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
Pakistan were the scene of 54 percent of the attacks in 2012, which accounted for 58 
percent of fatalities. Somalia was among the next five countries that suffered the highest 
number of terrorist attacks, which clearly indicates the link between terrorism and failed 
states. Somalia validates the claim that failed states are a security concern and that there 
is a significant terrorist operational presence in failed states like Somalia.78  
 
The data on the number and concentration of terrorist attacks post 9/11 appear to give 
credibility to the claim that nation building could become counter-productive, at least in 
the short term, as presence of the U.S. military and civilian personnel creates more targets 
and opportunities. However, one should keep in mind that the purpose of nation building 
is not to produce immediate results. Nation building is as a long-term solution that aims 
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to create a democratic and stable state that will eventually both reduce the potential for 




Promoting democracy through nation building was the focal point of the Bush foreign 
policy due to the widespread belief, both within the Bush administration and the 
American public, that failed states and the lack of democracy provide a fertile ground for 
the rise of Islamic extremism targeting the United States. The wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan became the hallmark of the Bush Presidency. President Obama’s national 
security strategy, despite his efforts to bring the troops home, remains centered on the 
danger posed by failed states. The U.S. allies and the UN share the view that nation 
building should be included in the set of tools for ensuring global stability.  
 
 
Both the proponents and critics of the idea that the most effective way to combat 
terrorism is to promote democracy through nation building are passionate about their 
belief. The arguments that support the claim that terrorism is not a concern in the 
majority of failed states presented in this chapter are quite convincing. However, it is 
evident that failed states present important opportunities for terrorist networks and there 
will likely be instances in the next few decades when failing and weak states will 
jeopardize global stability and serve as terrorist safe havens. The United States could find 
itself dragged into another nation building mission as a part of its efforts to ensure global 




global proportions. Available data indicates that democracies are far less likely to 
produce terrorists than autocracies. Therefore, democratization has a potential to provide 
a long-lasting antidote to terrorism. The Afghanistan case study indicates that progress is 
possible even in a country as complex and divided as Afghanistan. However, the progress 
is slow and requires decades long financial, political, and military support.  
 
The idea of nation building as an anti-terrorism tool is extremely polarizing; the majority 
of academia and policy makers are either “for” or “against.” Those who propose 
reexamining and fixing the nation building system so it can effectively address the 
security danger presented by terrorism emanating from failed states are in the minority.  
Even after Iraq and Afghanistan, there appears to be little effort to consolidate knowledge 
for the purpose of applying lessons learned to future missions. The main reason is 
resistance among the policy makers to accept that nation building will remain a relevant 
part of future national security strategy. Securing public support for nation building is 
difficult. Nation building is a costly endeavor that requires a long commitment even after 
military troops leave the host country and comes with no guarantees for success. 
 
Perhaps a good start in revamping the nation building system is to define what “failed 
states” means in the context of U.S. national security and, more importantly, classify 
weak and failing states and non-state actors operating within those states based on the 
likelihood of them attacking the United States and its interests. Secondly, it is time to 
fully understand the results that can be achieved through nation building as well as how 




viewed as the only, or even the principal, tool in the fight against terrorism. Nation 
building is as a long-term solution that aims to create a stable democratic state that will 
be able to both reduce the potential for the rise of terrorism and engage and eliminate 
terrorists operating within its borders. The main concern when discussing nation building 
as a part of the U.S. anti-terrorism strategy is high cost and casualties. Therefore, the 
United State should develop a comprehensive nation building strategy that does not 
necessarily involve a full-scale occupation of a country. A smart nation building strategy 
will also include providing sustained support for democratic elements in the target 
country and produce favorable results at low cost and with no American casualties.  
 
The time to develop nation building capacities is before the United States is faced with 
the next security crisis emanating from a post-conflict or failed state. The time to start the 
reform that will result in an effective nation building apparatus is now. History shows 
that American people are likely to support an intervention when vital interests and 
national security are at stake. It is up to the leadership to develop capacities, set realistic 








How Skilled is the U.S. Military in Leading Post 9/11 Nation Building?  
 
The traditional role of the military is to win wars by the use of force. Nowadays, 
policymakers and military personnel consider nation building, stability operations in 
military jargon, to be one of the core tasks of the U.S. military. The difference between 
war fighting and nation building is stark. While war fighting implies the use of force to 
achieve a definite goal and a clear exit strategy, nation building is characterized by 
achieving limited goals using limited means that very often do not include military 
force.79 The U.S. military was expected to make a rapid shift from combat operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq to nation building and achieve lasting success in the areas of 
governance and economy. Experience in the post 9/11 nation building missions in Iraq 
and Afghanistan indicates that solders’ core duties now include building relationships 
with the locals and promoting reconciliation, establishing the rule of law and governance, 
and improving living conditions along with providing security and maintaining combat 
readiness. This is a daunting task even for the world’s most powerful military.  
 
This chapter examines whether the military has the skills to take the lead in post 9/11 
nation building. Specifically, the focus in this chapter is on military leadership in the 
areas traditionally managed by civilian agencies, such as democratization and economic 
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development; it is evident the military’s primary nation building task is establishing and 
maintaining security. The chapter starts with an attempt to highlight policy decisions that 
resulted in the military taking the lead in post 9/11 nation building missions. In order to 
evaluate the military’s nation building skills, this chapter focuses on the military’s 
success in democratization and economic development in Germany and Japan at the end 
of the Second World War, and more recently in Iraq. The chapter also examines the 
changes in the military’s doctrine and the soldiers’ attitudes toward nation building to 
identify whether the military is ready to embrace nation building as one of its core duties. 
The discussion than turns to the implications of using the military as the main tool in 
nation building for the wider U.S. foreign policy goals and combat readiness. The main 
finding is that, while the military is indispensable in providing security and supporting 
interagency efforts, it lacks the training and skills to lead today’s complex missions, 
which fall under the broader definition of “nation building” rather than the more narrow 
definition of “state building.”  Consequently, this chapter proposes a "whole government" 
approach for securing success in future missions.  
 
Evolution of the Military as a Lead in Nation Building 
 
Nation building missions were unpopular in the 1990s. The prevailing view in the 
military establishment was that the main task of the U.S. military was to win wars and 
that military should not be used as a tool in national building missions. The Powell 
doctrine, which emerged in the 1990s and was named after General Colin Powell, states 




desired results. Additionally, the military should only be used when the goals are clearly 
defined. General Powell describes the doctrine as, “Decide what you are trying to achieve 
politically and if it can't be achieved through political and diplomatic and economic 
means, and you have to use military force, then make sure you know exactly what you're 
using the military force for and then apply it in a decisive manner.”80 Tasking the military 
with nation building is clearly at odds with the Powell Doctrine considering that nation 
building missions are prolonged endeavors that have broadly defined goals, such as 
democratization and economic recovery. Additionally, achieving these goals requires 
employing subtle diplomacy rather than decisive action because any nation building 
directed from outside, even when supported by reputable international institutions such as 
the United Nations, can be viewed as usurpation of the right of self-determination.81   
 
Both the Congress and the Department of State (DoS) shared the military’s view and 
considered nation building missions to be anomalies that did not require organizational 
restructuring or permanent allocation of resources. President Clinton was consistently 
criticized by his opponents in the Congress who claimed that his nation building missions 
were harming the readiness of the U.S. military. Nevertheless, President Clinton took 
steps to change the organizational structure of the National Security Council to better 
facilitate nation building missions. He established a directorate within the National 
Security Council to handle planning and coordination. Clinton’s Presidential Decision 
Directive 56 issued in 1997 attempted to create a set of procedures for future planning of 
                                                 
80 Maddow, Rachel. "Colin Powell Talks Rachel Maddow." MSNBC, April 1, 2009. 
81 Von Bogdandy, Armin. Häußler, Stefan. Hanschmann, Felix. Utz, Raphael. State-Building, Nation-
Building, and Constitutional Politics in Post-Conflict Situations: Conceptual Clarifications and an 





nation building missions as well as a model for interagency cooperation. However, 
President Bush, after rejecting nation building as a part of the national security strategy 
during his presidential campaign, entirely disassembled Clinton’s nation building 
element. There are indications that the military establishment resisted a directive by 
President Bush’s National Security Council that would have actually improved Clinton’s 
nation building structure. The Pentagon eventually rejected the directive.82  
 
In the absence of a nation building apparatus or an interagency structure of any kind, post 
9/11 missions in Afghanistan and Iraq made it clear that the military was to take the lead 
in all aspects of nation building including post conflict reconstruction efforts. This is 
especially evident in the planning stages for the invasion of Iraq. President Bush, in the 
light of the slow progress in Afghanistan due to the lack of interagency cooperation, 
transferred the responsibility for all nonmilitary aspects of the occupation from the 
Department of State (DoS) to the Department of Defense (DoD). Another possible 
justification for his decision is that President Bush wanted to ensure total commitment to 
the mission and unity of command by bypassing the DoS’s skepticism about the 
rationality of the decision to invade Iraq.83 The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), 
the transitional Iraqi government, was put under the auspices of DoD. Even though 
retired United States Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner, the first CPA Administrator, 
was quickly replaced by a State Department diplomat L. Paul Bremer, the fact that 
Bremer continued to report to the Secretary of Defence clearly indicates that the DoD 
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continued to lead democratization and economic development.84 Initial results of the CPA 
were disappointing. For instance, CPA was never fully staffed. Additionally, the CPA 
had an extremely high turnover and the level of expertise in the lower ranks was 
unsatisfactory. However, at the end of 2005, perhaps after recognizing the shortcomings 
of a policy that did not allow for a robust presence of civilian experts in the field, the 
Bush administration deployed the first DoS-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), 
which included civilian political and economic experts. The efforts to increase the 
number of PTRs intensified in 2007 following President Bush’s announcement that the 
United States would double the number of PRTs in Iraq.85 
 
Putting the Military in the Lead: Smart Decision or a Mistake?   
 
 
Some analysts and policy makers believe that the U.S. military is capable of taking the 
lead if given the appropriate tools and authorizations. Proponents of this view point to 
nation building experiences after the Second World War and the reconstruction efforts in 
Germany and Japan that were spearheaded by the U.S. military. The United States’ 
military was required for the first time in its history to transition from war fighting to 
stabilization efforts. Germany and Japan were a complete success that has not been 
repeated since.86  It could be argued that the decision of the Bush administration to put the 
military in charge of the reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq is an attempt to 
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duplicate the success in Germany and Japan rather than build on the experiences gained 
in the post Cold War nation building missions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo.87  
 
In the absence of a dedicated nation building apparatus, the DoD emerges as a logical 
lead considering that the DoD is best funded and the most powerful tool in the U.S. 
arsenal. The best alternative to the DoD appears to be the DoS and there are signs that the 
DoS is attempting to create a standing nation building office. One notable effort is the 
creation of the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and 
Stabilization (S/CRS) in July 2004. Its official mandate is to “help stabilize and 
reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a 
sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy.” 88 S/CRS’s role is to 
coordinate interagency efforts, including both planning and operations, and to develop 
expertise by building on knowledge from past missions.89 However, the lack of funding 
could render S/CRS ineffective and inconsequential.90 It is plausible to argue that putting 
the DoD in the lead will make it more difficult for the DoS, the agency that has far more 
expertise in the area of international relations and development, to get sufficient funding 
for development of its nation building capabilities.     
 
Some argue that reliance upon the U.S. military to lead nation building might have a 
negative effect on how those missions are prioritized and carried out. The main argument 
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is that the military does not have the necessary expertise to engage in tasks such as the 
rule of law, governance, and economic recovery as it has no training or experience in 
these areas. Nation building missions led by the U.S. military are likely to focus on short-
term objectives such as providing security and building ad-hoc institutions of governance. 
On the other hand, solutions traditionally offered by civilian agencies such as the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) tend to be more comprehensive 
and permanent.91   
 
Another important consideration is that the U.S. military might become a de facto 
primary foreign policy instrument and negatively impact the State Department’s 
credibility.  Having the military emerge as a diplomatic instrument could also endanger 
foreign policy goals.  Researcher Nina Serifino observed that, “the use of U.S. military 
personnel in state-building activities may convey mixed signals in activities where the 
objective is to promote democracy and enhance civilian control . . . by reinforcing 
stereotypes in underdeveloped nations – such as that military forces are more competent 
than civilians – or legitimize the use of military forces for civilian governmental 
responsibilities.92 
 
The following two sections test the validity of these opposing views by examining the 
level of success the military was able to achieve in the areas of democratization and 
economic development in nation building missions at the end of the Second World War 
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in Germany and Japan, and more recently in Iraq. The case studies focus on how the 
success achieved, or the lack of success, exemplifies the military’s nation building skills.  
 
Examining Experience Before 9/11: Germany and Japan 
 
Following Germany’s surrender in May 1945, the country and its capital were divided 
into sectors and each sector was controlled by one of the allied forces - United States, 
United Kingdom, France, and Soviet Union. The command of the American sector was 
given to the Office of Military Government, United States (OMGUS). Considering that 
the German civilian government had been dismantled, the military governors were in 
charge of their respective sectors. The first military governor of the American sector was 
General Dwight D. Eisenhower who delegated almost all responsibility to General Lucius 
D. Clay.93 In the initial phase of the occupation, the United States policy, which was 
articulated in the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s directive 1067 (JCS 1067), was punitive and 
reflected the belief that Germans carried a collective guilt for the war. OMGUS was 
tasked with demobilizing the German military, establishing security, initiating 
denazification of the German society, and democratization.94  
 
After banning the Nazi Party and disbanding the German military, the U.S. military 
focused on eliminating Nazi influence from press, business and financial institutions, and 
schools. The military successfully undertook the task of dismantling financial cartels, 
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revising textbooks, as well as extracting restitutions from the remnants of the German 
economy. The purge of the German society was of massive proportions. The U.S. 
military investigated a total of thirteen million Germans for war crimes or Nazi 
affiliations and charged more than three million for various offenses. Despite initial 
limitations on economic assistance imposed by Washington due to the belief that only a 
retributive economic policy could eliminate German militarism, Clay devoted significant 
effort to improving the standard of living in the American sector. He successfully 
restored public utilities, cleared roads, and delivered rations and supplies to prevent 
hunger and disease.95 
 
Military commanders in the field called from the very beginning for rehabilitation of 
German society and recognized the importance of working with local representatives. In 
late 1945, General George Patton, the governor of the Bavaria province, warned that 
“more than half the German people were Nazis and we would be in a hell of a fix if we 
removed all Nazi party members from office.”96 The initial purge of the German society 
left only a small number of qualified individuals to assist in democratization efforts. 
Nevertheless, Clay selected three local Germans who had “clean” past, meaning they had 
not belonged to the Nazi party or committed war crimes, and appointed them as regional 
administrators in the U.S. sector. Their main duties included advising and assisting Clay 
in development and implementation of various policies. They were also tasked with 
finding other “clean” German officials who were qualified to serve as advisors to the U.S. 
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military. Clay relied on advice from these “clean” Germans when establishing police 
force, quasi courts, and local administrations.97 
 
The military recognized the importance of wining over the local population even when 
policy makers in Washington favored a more punitive policy. Clay warned Washington 
that not addressing food shortages and economic devastation would result in a communist 
Germany. Clay is quoted as saying that “there is no choice between becoming a 
communist on 1,500 calories and a believer in democracy on 1,000 calories.”98 While 
Washington was deliberating whether to change course and adopt a less retaliatory 
policy, Clay took matters into his own hands and used a loophole in JCS 1067 to increase 
daily humanitarian rations to 1,500 calories per day.99  
 
By the summer of 1947, due to the intensifying of the Cold War and economic stagnation 
in Europe, Washington changed course and began focusing on restarting the German 
economy as a part of a wider European recovery plan. The United States viewed a 
democratic Germany with strong economy as the only viable exit strategy and a way to 
limit the Soviet influence. As a result, JCS 1067 was replaced by a much less punitive 
JCS 1779. This change in policy enabled the military to achieve rapid success in both 
democratization and economic recovery. Under JCS 1779 more than ninety percent of 
Germans purged under JCS 1067 were rehabilitated and General Clay was able to further 
increase the rations. As the standard of living improved and promises of economic 
recovery translated into action, Germans embraced the reforms. After the French, British, 
                                                 






and American sectors were united into one entity, local governance was restored. The 
new entity was awarded common currency, license plates, and identity documentation.100 
The biggest challenge proved to be the beginning of the Cold War as Germany was 
caught in the struggle between the United States and Soviet Union. Even though it took 
forty-five years to reunite the country, Germany developed into a democratic society with 
a thriving economy. The military’s leadership under General Clay resulted in a complete 
success.101  
 
Japan surrendered unconditionally in August 1945 following the atomic bombing of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The United States was the only occupying force in Japan and 
General Douglas MacArthur was in charge of all reconstruction efforts. The mission in 
Japan showed that a democratic society can be introduced into a non-western country that 
had no democratic history. The success in Japan is viewed as another example of the 
success of the U.S. military leadership in nation building as the military had a complete 
charge of the nation building efforts. The U.S. military under the leadership of General 
MacArthur spearheaded political, social, and economic change.102  
The occupation policy for Japan was articulated in the United States Initial Post-
Surrender Policy Relating to Japan (Potsdam) and the JCS directive 1380/15. While the 
Potsdam clearly identified reparations, demilitarization, and democratization as the main 
goals of the occupation, it was rather ambiguous about the role of the Japan’s emperor. 
However, the emperor proved to be no obstacle to the reforms as he fully supported 
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MacArthur's actions. It is important to note that, while the official policy for the 
occupation of Japan was to be formulated by the allied powers, in reality MacArthur and 
his administration named Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP) directed all 
democratization and reconstruction efforts. SCAP consisted of about a dozen sections. 
The most influential sections were the Government section that oversaw political reform 
and the Economic and Scientific section that oversaw economic reform.103 
The military launched the reforms immediately following the occupation. Land reform 
was one of the first and most consequential programs. Under MacArthur’s land reform, 
the government bought the land from absentee landlords and redistributed the land to 
tenant farmers. MacArthur believed that the land reform was one of his most important 
successes. He remarked that, “The redistribution formed a strong barrier against any 
introduction of Communism in rural Japan. Every farmer in the country was now a 
capitalist in his own right.”104 The military accomplished great success in the sphere of 
civil liberties and freedom of speech as well. Workers were given the right to organize 
and strike, political prisoners were released from jail, and women were given the right to 
vote for the first time in the Japanese history. The military undertook reforms of the 
educational system as well.105 
MacArthur elected to keep Japanese government officials who were not implicated in 
war crimes in office from the beginning of the occupation. However, they worked 
under his close supervision and their primary role was to legitimize decisions made by 
MacArthur. This was especially evident during the process of ratification of Japan’s 
                                                 






postwar constitution. While the constitution was ratified by the Japanese parliament, 
no member of the parliament participated in the drafting of the constitution. The 
constitution was drafted by a constitutional convention composed of U.S. military 
officers and civilians. The draft provoked a negative reaction from the parliament 
members as it awarded extensive political, social, and economic rights and liberties. 
Most remarkably, Article 9 of the draft read, “The Japanese people forever renounce 
war as a sovereign right of the nation . . . land, sea and air forces as well as other war 
potential will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be 
recognized.”106 Parliament members argued that such a constitution was incompatible 
with Japanese traditions. Despite initial resistance by the lawmakers, MacArthur was 
resolute in his mission to transform Japan into a liberal democracy. After he 
threatened to put up the draft for public referendum, the parliament proceeded to ratify 
the constitution draft in its entirety. Japan regained sovereignty in 1953. Since then, 
Japan has continued to grow as a strong democracy and a formidable economic 
force.107 
The military had a total command of all nation building aspects in both Germany and 
Japan. It could be argued that the unity of command, which was achieved by putting the 
military in the lead, was the biggest contributor to the success. The unity of command 
ensured total commitment to the mission and maximum efficacy. With the military in the 
lead, the possibility of tensions between military and civilian agencies that could have 
slowed down the progress was eliminated. The military was resolute and methodical in 
transforming Germany and Japan into democracies. Clay and MacArthur recognized the 






importance of working with local officials and had the foresight to co-op local structures 
and use them to legitimize their policy decisions. However, it is important to point out 
elements that are unique to the German and Japanese experiences and that have not been 
present in post Cold War and post 9/11 nation building efforts. It is plausible to argue that 
the set of these unique elements, rather than nation building skills of the military, was the 
biggest contributor to the success.  
 
It could be argued that the success in Germany and Japan is due to the fact that these 
were cases of “state building” rather than “nation building.” In political science, state 
building is broadly defined as the establishment of government structures while nation 
building refers to the construction of a national identity.108 Additionally, while nation 
failure is often accompanied by state failure, rebuilding a failed state does not necessarily 
include constructing a national identity.109 When used in policy discussions in the context 
of the post-Cold War and post 9/11 interventions, the term nation building has a much 
broader meaning and refers to implementing political and economic reforms in a society 
emerging from conflict, generally with no existing national identity, with the goal of 
transforming that society into a stable democracy.110 Considering that both Germany and 
Japan were countries with strong national identity where the military was focused on co-
opting existing government institutions, those missions were limited to state building. 
They do not fit the wider definition of nation building that emerged post-Cold War and 
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post 9/11, which is arguably a more complex endeavor as it contains elements of both 
state building and nation building. 
 
Furthermore, Germany had some experience with democracy in the years prior to Second 
World War. The Weimar Republic, predecessor of Nazi Germany, had a parliamentary 
government with active political parties. Additionally, Germany was surrounded by well-
established democracies and was quickly integrated into NATO.111 In the Japanese 
experience, even though Japan had no prior experience with democracy, the military 
encountered no meaningful opposition. The official Japanese government, even after they 
fully recognized the magnitude of the social and economic reforms, assumed the role of 
onlookers and did not attempt to push back in a meaningful sense. The emperor showed 
no willingness to challenge the reforms and encouraged full cooperation.112 It is also 
important to note that there was no significant German or Japanese resistance following 
the surrender of their armed forces. 
 
The end of the Cold War marked the beginning of an era of frequent and prolonged 
nation building engagements by the United States, both unilaterally and as a member of 
multinational coalitions. While the role of the U.S. military was critical in the missions in 
Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, the U.S. military did not have the control of the 
reconstructions efforts as it did in Germany and Japan; democratization and economic 
recovery were for the most part carried out by civilian agencies. The level of success 
achieved in Germany and Japan has not been repeated in the post-Cold War missions, 
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which were cases of state failure aggravated by nation failure. The mission in Kosovo is 
often viewed as the most successful post–Cold War nation building mission. In Kosovo, 
free democratic local and national elections took place two years after the conflict ended 
and the economy has been showing impressive growth second only to the economic 
growth of Germany. While the role of the military in establishing security was the key for 
success, it was the participation of civilian agencies and international cooperation that 
ensured lasting results. The success of the Kosovo mission is mainly due to excellent 
management and collaboration in the international community.  The mission had a 
remarkable unity of command despite broad international participation of both military 
and civilian agencies.113 
 
Examining Experience Post 9/11: Iraq  
 
After the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the military was once again asked to take the lead in 
nation building and bring about the level of success it achieved in Germany and Japan.  
However, in Afghanistan and Iraq the military faced an environment drastically different 
from the environment in Germany and Japan after the Second World War.  While the 
U.S. military faced little resistance in Germany and Japan and established security 
relatively quickly, it has been fighting deadly insurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq from 
the beginning of the occupation. There is no strong national Afghan or Iraqi identity and 
there are very few governmental structures and qualified local officials to serve as 
reliable partners to the U.S. military.  
 
                                                 




The post 9/11 mission in Iraq represents an excellent case study as it provides an 
opportunity to evaluate the military’s skills in leading today’s more complex nation 
building missions. Following the conclusion of combat operations in Iraq, the U.S. 
military forces were expected to rapidly transition into nation building part of the 
mission. The U.S. military had the responsibility to both provide security and lead all 
aspects of nation building efforts.  The military’s responsibilities included providing 
basic services to the impoverished population, establishing the rule of law and 
governance, and administering micro and macro grants. There was no notable 
interagency structure on the ground at the beginning of the occupation and the 
responsibility for nation building belonged solely to the military.114  
 
U.S. Army War College released an important study authored by Colonel Mark L. 
Edmonds that provides an insider look into the challenges that the military faced in the 
initial stages of its nation building mission in Iraq. Colonel Edmonds paints two different 
pictures – one of the wider area of Baghdad from April 2004 to February 2005 and one of 
Northern Iraq from August 2006 to December 2007. Despite some geographical and 
demographical differences outlined in the case studies, the nation building tasks were 
comparable. The security situation in Northern Iraq in early 2006 was similar to that in 
Baghdad in 2004. The military focus in both cases was governance, economics, rule of 
law, and security.115  
 
                                                 
114 Dobbins, “After the War: Nation-building From FDR to George W. Bush.” 2008.  
115 Edmonds, Mark L. “The Army’s Role in Nation Building.” U.S. Army War College, 27 February 2009. 




Colonel Edmonds’s study shows that, even if the military was able to move forward in 
the areas of governance and the rule of law, sustainable results were achieved only when 
significant interagency structure and expertise from the civilian agencies was present on 
the ground. Colonel Edmonds concludes that the expertise of the Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) brought sustainable results in Iraq.116 
a) Baghdad from April 2004 to February 2005 
 
When the U.S. forces took control of the Baghdad area, its population, a mix of Sunni 
and Shia, was six to seven million in an area of approximately 200 square miles. Sadr 
City, a predominately Shia zone with more than two and a half million residents and the 
infrastructure to support only 500,000, is also a part of Baghdad.  The transfer of 
administrative duties from DoD’s Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, 
an agency created before the invasion to take on the role of an administrator until the 
elections, to the CPA did not result in much needed interagency structure on the 
ground.117   
 
The U.S. military in the wider area of Baghdad faced a wide spectrum of challenges that 
clearly surpassed its expertise and resources. The main problems were poor living 
conditions, broken and inadequate infrastructure, and a weak economy with a 61 percent 
unemployment rate. The military was expected to address all these issues while 
simultaneously providing security to both Sunni and Shia population.118  
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The military’s initial focus was improving the living conditions by rebuilding 
infrastructure. While restoring essential public services, the military undertook a 
campaign to educate the public about the democratic process and build up the credibility 
of the new Iraqi government. Creating sustainable employment opportunities was also 
high on the priorities list as the commanders in the field related high insurgency to high 
unemployment rates.  Another focus was training the Iraqi police force and army. The 
U.S. military also had the task of overseeing the first democratic elections scheduled for 
January 2005.119  
 
Even without significant participation of civilian and diplomatic agencies, the U.S. 
military made noteworthy achievements. The military completed over the 800 civil 
engineering projects worth $104 million, built six hundred schools, and disbursed about 
$8.3 million in micro and macro grants. About 20,000 Iraqis were employed on 
infrastructure and sanitation projects. Notable progress was made in training Iraqi local 
police and the army. The military funded and equipped fourteen police academies and 
trained seven Iraqi army battalions. In order to increase credibility of the local 
government, the military gave credit for all these accomplishments to the local 
authorities. As a result, the elections in January 2005 had a turnout rate of 51 percent.120 
 
However, the successes were short lived as the U.S. forces had limited resources and 
could not apply the same focus on every neighborhood.  As a result, the security situation 
disintegrated as the levels of sectarian violence increased.  The military had to abandon 
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its focus on democratization and economic development and put all resources into 
improving security. Subsequently, both the living standard of the population and the 
credibility of the local government decreased.121 
b) Northern Iraq from August 2006 to December 2007 
 
The second case study is Northern Iraq, more specifically the area of Tikrit, which is the 
regional center of Salah ad Din province. This area is the birthplace of the ousted Iraqi 
president Saddam Hussein. Therefore, it is predominately Sunni and has a large number 
of former Ba-ath party officials. The main focus of the U.S. military in this area was 
establishing local governance and the rule of law while maintaining security. The area of 
Tikrit was very specific as it required integration of the former supporters of Saddam 
Hussein and the Ba-ath party and the newly established Shia central government in 
Baghdad.  In order to achieve that task, the military placed a priority on establishing 
communication channels and building trust between the provincial and central 
government.122 
 
There was one notable difference between Baghdad and the Tikrit area. The U.S. military 
in the Tikrit area was supported by one of the first PRTs in Iraq. PRTs in Iraq were under 
the control of the State Department and their main task was to pursue political goals of 
the United States by building relationships with the local governments through a variety 
of initiatives designed to improve local governance and security.123 Even though PRTs 
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did not bring additional resources, they filled the expertise gap in the area of governance, 
economics, rule of law, and public diplomacy. 124 This kind expertise is precisely what 
had been missing. 
 
One of the most important nation building tasks in Northern Iraq was establishing the rule 
of law by supporting local law enforcement.  After the combat operations ended, the 
military started training local police and prosecutors as well building police stations, 
courts, and secure residences for local judges.  Introduction of PRTs resulted in 
accelerated and sustainable progress. For instance, personnel from the United States 
Department of Justice contingent of the PRTs provided much needed expertise in the rule 
of law part of the mission. The end result was a credible legal process and a skilled Iraqi 
legal staff. The Justice Department contingent assisted in facilitation of the 
communications between the provincial government and the central government in 
Baghdad through its links with the U.S. Embassy. At the same time, the Department of 
State governance experts worked with the military to help establish a functioning and 
trusting relationship between the provincial and central government. After the PRTs 
assumed parts of the national building mission, the military was able to focus on 
rebuilding infrastructure and improving security.125 With the presence of the right experts 
from the Justice Department and the State Department on the ground, the nation building 
mission in Northern Iraq became a model for interagency effort. 
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The importance of joint work between the military and civilian agencies is evident in the 
effort to establish dialogue between the provincial leaders and the central government. 
Because the Tikrit area was filled with former sympathizers of Saddam’s regime, 
representatives of the Shia central government in Baghdad were reluctant to visit the area 
and provincial leaders from Tikrit refused to travel to Baghdad due to security concerns. 
This problem was resolved through interagency efforts. While DoS and DoJ personnel 
worked with provincial leaders, the U.S. Ambassador in Baghdad pressured the central 
government to meet with provincial officials. To minimize security concerns, the military 
agreed to transport key provincial leaders to Baghdad. The result was the visit by Prime 
Minister, Minister of Defense, Minister of the Interior and Minister of Electricity to the 
province in August 2007.126 The interagency effort succeeded in building a lasting 
understanding between the central government and the provincial officials. It is clear that 
no single agency or the military alone could have achieved the same result.  
 
Soldiers as Nation Builders: Military Attitudes Are Changing  
 
Prior to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S military was not open to incorporating 
nation building into its doctrine.  The military doctrine published in 2001 prior to the 9/11 
attacks did not contain any references to nation building operations even though at that 
time the U.S. forces were performing peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Kosovo.127   
Some analysts point out that the resistance to include the term nation building in the U.S. 
military’s Joint Dictionary is an example of how hesitant the military leadership was to 
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define nation building as a military operation. The resistance seems natural considering 
the difference between warfare operations and stability operations.  In its essence, the 
warfare doctrine includes achieving total victory and a speedy withdrawal. On the other 
hand, nation building operations employ limited means to achieve a set of specific goals 
over an extended period of time.128  
 
Experience in Iraq and Afghanistan persuaded the military establishment that, in the 
absence of other sound alternatives, the DoD would continue to be asked to take the lead 
in nation building missions. It became clear that nation building has become a standard 
military operation and that military doctrine should reflect that change. Department of 
Defense Directive 3000.05 (DODD 3000.05) issued in November 2005 states that 
“stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall 
be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations.”129 Analysts 
stress the importance of DODD 3000.05 as it shifts the focus from combat operations to 
stability operations and asserts that stability operations have a more important impact on 
the national security objectives then traditional combat operations.130 Additionally, U.S. 
Army Field Manual 3-07, a principal military publication that contains information and 
guidance for soldiers serving in the field, now makes references to a new type of victory 
that includes “power to promote participation in government, spur economic 
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development, and address the root causes of conflict among the disenfranchised 
populations of the world.” 131 
 
Another relevant topic in the context of the military leading nation building is whether 
soldiers whose training focuses on traditional war fighting have the right attitude to 
conduct nation building operations. Volker C. Franke and Karen Guttieri in the study 
entitled Picking Up the Pieces: Are United States Officers Ready for Nation Building 
present their findings on this topic. They examine whether soldiers who had been trained 
to maneuver tanks and fire weapons are equipped with knowledge and attitude to discuss 
local politics and administer microloans to local entrepreneurs. The study was published 
in 2009, when the nation building missions in Afghanistan and Iraq were in a full swing, 
and aims to follow up on the finding of previously conducted studies that officers with 
operational experience view nation building as less fulfilling and not as vital to the 
central role of the U.S. military.132  
 
Franke and Guttieri collected empirical data to determine if military officers have the 
necessary mental preparedness to make the rapid shift from combat to stabilization 
operations.  Their sampling included considerations of the military branch and the branch 
of service (combat, combat support, and combat service support), field experience, 
gender, and sociopolitical views.  Respondents were mid-career, mid-level officers who 
are likely to be involved in ongoing or future stability operations. Some of the questions 
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respondents were asked to answer were whether (1) “peacekeeping missions take the 
fighting edge away,” (2) “they liked the human side associated with peacekeeping 
missions,” and (3) "a soldier who is well-trained in military skills still needs additional 
skills for peacekeeping missions.”133  Franke and Guttieri found that officers across all 
military branches expressed comparable levels of support for stability operations. On the 
other hand, there were notable differences when they compared responses of combat and 
non-combat officers.134  
 
Franke and Guttieri found that 59 percent of combat support officers disagreed that 
peacekeeping missions negatively impact combat readiness compared to 44 percent of 
combat officers. They also found that 67 percent of combat support officers stated that 
they liked the “human side” of the peace keeping missions compared to 52 percent of the 
combat officers. Over 90 percent of respondents agreed that soldiers primarily trained for 
combat need special skills to conduct peacekeeping missions. Over 70 percent of 
respondents agreed that peace keeping skills are relevant to their military training. More 
than half of respondents agreed that they could make a contribution in a peacekeeping 
mission.135  
 
Another important finding is that more than half of respondents from all branches stated 
that it would be difficult to shift from combat to peacekeeping operations and that the 
limitation of using force only in self-defense makes the peacekeeping job more difficult.  
Between 80 and 90 percent of respondents stated that cooperation between military and 
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civilian agencies is essential for success in nation building. Over 80 and 90 percent of 
respondents agreed that building a rapport with locals and developing cultural and 
ethnical sensitivity is important for mission success.136 
 
Franke and Guttieri state that their findings differ from the findings of the studies 
conducted immediately following the end of the Cold War. Post Cold-War studies 
indicated that senior military officers did not view nation building as being central to the 
U.S. military’s mission. Franke and Guttieri found that military officers today are aware 
that stabilization and peace operations are an important part of the military’s job and they 
expressed willingness to sharpen their skills in that area through additional training. 
Additionally, the difference in the attitudes between different branches and branch 
services seems to be diminishing.137 
 
Franke and Guttieri found that officers at all levels recognize the importance of 
cooperation between military and civilian agencies in the context of nation building. 
They believe that global institutions should be strengthened and that coordination with 
civilian and non-governmental agencies as well as with allies and local population is 
essential for success.  Franke and Guttieri conclude that that the majority of respondents 
in their sample are cognitively ready to make the switch from combat to peace keeping 
and stabilization operations.138  
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Is There a Price to Pay?  
 
As the U.S. military is building capacity and expertise it currently lacks in nation building 
missions, there is a danger that its war fighting capabilities will deteriorate. If the military 
training focuses on non-combat missions, combat capabilities could become neglected 
and military readiness could suffer.139 While there have been no obvious signs that the 
U.S. military capabilities and readiness have been negatively affected due to its 
continuous engagements in stability operations, the Israeli experience during the 2006 
Lebanon War can serve as a warning of what happens when the military loses sight of its 
primary job.  
 
In the late 1990s, Israeli military leadership made a conscious decision to focus its 
training on non-combat and unconventional military operations. Military training was 
restructured to emphasize counter insurgency and border protection. The border 
protection operations performed at the time included six-month deployments with a one-
month break in between each deployment.  As a result, at the beginning of the 2006 
Lebanon War Israeli Defense Force was unprepared for high intensity combat operations. 
The soldiers did not possess tactical skills and coordination capabilities. At the beginning 
of the war, as a direct result of the focus on unconventional military operations, Israeli 
Defense Force, despite being the most formidable military in the region, was unable to 
overwhelm a much inferior enemy.140  
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A number of U.S. military leaders have voiced their concern about the impact of stability 
operations on the combat readiness of the American military.  In 2007, then Army’s 
Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker testified that he was concerned about the 
readiness of the U.S. military despite the considerable amount of technical and combat 
resources available. In a 2008 white paper dealing with the state of traditional combat 
skills in the U.S. Army, three U.S. Army colonels who served in Iraq as brigade 
commanders stated that as much as ninety percent of the soldiers in Iraq were performing 
duties outside their training. For instance, artillery soldiers were required to drive trucks. 
They observed that, as a result of these unconventional duties, the soldiers lost the skills 
they obtained during their military training. A significant number of soldiers were not 






The German and Japanese experiences paint a picture of a complete success when the 
military is given absolute control of the nation building efforts. On the other hand, Iraq is 
an example of the military struggling to achieve a lasting success despite having total 
control of the mission. Therefore, it is important to identify factors that contributed to the 
success on one hand and hindered progress on the other.  
 
                                                 




The most notable factor is the level of complexity of the mission; it could be argued that 
the military is skilled enough to lead missions limited to “state building” but not missions 
that also include the “nation building” element. State building, as exemplified in 
Germany and Japan, is an easier endeavor as it does not require constructing a national 
identity and building legitimacy of newly established state institutions. In both Germany 
and Japan there was a sense of strong national identity. The military achieved the success 
by co-opting existing institutions and reforming an already established economic base. 
On the other hand, the mission in Iraq was a case of both “state building” and “nation 
building” as it required building a national identity and constructing democratic 
government institutions and economy in a country that had no experience with 
democracy or a solid economic base.  
 
Another important factor is the unity of command. It is plausible to argue that giving the 
military the lead in all aspects of nation building, as was the case in Germany and Japan, 
is the safest way to ensure unity of command and complete dedication to the mission. 
However, Kosovo exemplifies that the unity of command can be achieved in missions 
that have wide participation of both military and civilian agencies. The success in the 
area of democratization and economic recovery in Kosovo is the result of the work of 
civilian agencies while the military was focused on its traditional role of providing 
security. Reconstruction can be started only after security is established. The mission in 
Iraq evidences that when security situation requires full attention and resources of the 
military reconstruction goals cannot be achieved by military alone.  The Iraq case study 




reconstruction tasks and the military was able to focus on its traditional role of providing 
security and supporting interagency efforts. Therefore, the leadership and skills of the 
civilian sector, rather than the military’s leadership, produced results.   
 
Considering the dangers emanating from failed states, the more complex nation building 
missions, such as the post 9/11 mission in Iraq, are likely to become the norm in the 
foreseeable future.142 It is clear that the U.S military will continue to play an important 
part in future missions as the military is indispensable in establishing security. Recent 
revisions of the military doctrine to include stabilization operations as well as the change 
in the attitudes across military ranks exemplify that the military establishment has 
recognized nation building as one of its core duties. However, both the leadership and 
rank and file soldiers, while admitting the need for additional training, call for a greater 
assistance from the civilian sector and an effective interagency structure. The military 
should not be expected to lead projects on the rule of law, governance, and economy.  
Requiring the military to develop those capabilities has a potential of diminishing its 
ability to defend homeland and win conventional wars. Additionally, the military taking 
the leadership has a potential to undermine the efforts of the DoS to develop nation 
building capabilities.  
a) Exploring Solutions: Whole Government Approach 
 
Analysts, scholars, as well as officials inside the government have been calling for a 
"whole government" approach to nation building. This approach will require willingness 
and resources to develop effective interdepartmental processes. For the whole 
                                                 




government approach to work, there will have to be a strong relationship between the 
military and civilian agencies in both planning and execution, which has not been the 
case in the past. For instance, in Iraq many have become frustrated with persistent 
interagency tensions best described by Army Lt. Gen. Mark Hertling’s statement that 
very often he had to "force the State Department" to comply with his directions. Lt. Gen. 
Hertling said, "You do have to sometimes be heavy handed and say, ‘this is what you're 
going to do or we're going to stop the convoy support for you. What do you say about 
that, Mr. Ambassador?'” 143  
 
Building a whole government approach will also require civilian departments and 
agencies that are capable to take over the nation building aspects the military is not 
trained to carry out. It appears that some important work in this area has been started; 
S/CRS’s Civilian Response Corps (CRS) seem to be a step in the right direction. The 
CRSs are designed to employ 250 highly skilled personnel from civilian agencies and 
will be able to deploy to the crisis area to carry out stability operations with 48 hours 
notice. Besides the DoS personnel, CRSs will be staffed with personnel from the 
Departments of Justice, Agriculture, Homeland Security, Treasury, Commerce, Health 
and Human Services, and USAID. 144  Therefore, it is of paramount importance that the 
Congress appropriates sufficient funding that will enable the DoS to continue building up 
its capacities. 
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The fact that CRSs will not include personnel from the DoD does not seem to be creating 
a problem in the military establishment as the military supports the project and the 
Defense Secretary Robert Gates has been calling for assistance from civilian agencies in 
nation building.145 The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the main public document 
that analyses strategic objectives and describes military doctrine, published in January 
2009 stresses the importance of the whole government approach and interagency 
cooperation. QDR reads that even though some progress has been made “continued 
improvement requires a sustained focus on developing whole-of-government strategies 




If the military continues to be the lead in nation building efforts it could be perceived 
abroad as the main diplomatic instrument of the American foreign policy. This clearly 
puts American foreign policy goals at risk. It sends a wrong message to the host country 
that the military is the solution to all problems and more effective than civilian 
government. The United States has to be able to develop a nation building model that will 
utilize all of her resources while transforming the military into a force capable to meet all 
of the challenges of the rapidly changing 21st century security environment. It is clear that 
continuing to rely on the military in all aspects of nation building efforts simply because 
there is no other viable option, will not achieve desired results and will endanger wider 
foreign policy goals. Therefore, the whole government approach is a start in building a 
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sustainable nation building strategy. Even though some progress has been made there is 








Building a Sustainable Afghan Government: Centralized vs. Decentralized State Model    
 
Afghanistan is the longest nation building mission conducted by the United States and 
whether the end result is a sustainable Afghan state will undoubtedly define the prospect 
for any future nation building missions.  The lessons from building a sustainable 
government in Afghanistan, which is the ultimate goal of nation building efforts, will be 
of paramount importance should the United States decide to consolidate lessons from past 
missions and develop a nation building apparatus.  
 
After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the Afghan people made a decision to form a unitary 
state and pursue a centralized government model. This decision, supported by the United 
States and the rest of the international community, resulted in a constitution that gives all 
executive, legislative, and judicial authority to the national government in Kabul. The 
current constitution created a highly centralized government; the president appoints 
provincial governors and most mid-level sub-provincial officials. Even though the 
constitution provides for a democratic election of provincial, district, municipal, and 
village councils, the elections have been held for only a few provincial councils. The 




history of central governments not being able to provide security to the remote rural 
areas, all security forces are national forces. 147  
 
This chapter examines which government model, centralized or decentralized, is most 
likely to result in a sustainable Afghan state. The discussion focuses on two areas that are 
most consequential for the sustainability of the new Afghan state in the context of the 
complex history of Afghanistan. The first area is the inability of the central government 
to extend its reach and establish authority in rural areas. Therefore, this chapter examines 
tribalism in Afghanistan in order to identify solutions to the historically dysfunctional 
relationship between the central government and the periphery. In an effort to identify 
lessons that can be applied to today’s interactions with the tribes, the chapter presents 
challenges that Great Britain and the Soviet Union faced in bringing the Pashtun tribes 
under the central rule. The second area is the fragile security situation. The Arbakai 
network serves as an excellent case study when examining whether local structures can 
contribute to maintaining security gains achieved during the U.S. military presence. The 
discussion then turns to the current developments in the area of governance and whether 
the current highly centralized model is functioning in Afghanistan.  The main finding is 
that a plausible solution for Afghanistan seems to be a flexible centralized model that will 
allow division of responsibilities between the center and the periphery. A functional local 
government system that is built ground-up and engaged with Kabul is the key for the 
survival of the state.  
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Tribalism in Afghanistan   
 
Afghanistan is home to several religious sects and many ethnic, linguistic, and tribal 
groups. Pashtuns are the largest ethnic group. Tajiks make up the second largest group 
followed by Hazaras, Uzbeks, Turkmen, and Qizilbash. Additionally, there are over 100 
other tribes and ethnic groups.148 Pashtuns in Afghanistan belong to nearly 30 distinct 
tribes. Each tribe is divided into clans and lineages. About half of the Pashtun tribes 
belong to either the Durrani or the Ghilzai alliance, which are the two most influential 
Pashtun alliances in Afghanistan. The Durrani are predominant in the southwest 
Afghanistan, between Farah and Kandahar, while the Ghilzai are predominant in the 
southeast, between Kandahar and Kabul. It is also important to note that approximately 
ten million Pashtuns live in neighboring Pakistan where they represent the majority in the 
North-West Frontier Province and the northern part of the Baluchistan Province. Pashtuns 
speak Indo-Iranian and follow a social code called Pashtunwali, which translates into “the 
way of the Pashtun.” Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai is a former Popalzai Pashtun 
tribal leader.149 
 
Tajiks and Hazaras are the two largest ethics groups following the Pashtuns. Tajiks 
account for about 25 percent of the population and they are concentrated in Kabul and in 
the Heart Province. Tajiks mostly live in urban areas and they are literate in Dari, a 
dialect of the Persian language that is the official government language in Afghanistan. 
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As a result, Tajiks living in urban areas have traditionally served as partners in 
governance to the Pashtuns. Hazaras account for about 19 percent of the population. 
Historically, Hazaras have been politically and economically inferior to Pashtuns and 
Tajiks.150 
 
Relationships between the tribes are often contentious and hostile. In addition to power 
struggles within Afghanistan, many of the Afghan tribes have ethnic ties with other 
nations. Pashtuns in Afghanistan have ties with Pashtuns in Pakistan. Afghan Uzbeks 
have ties with Uzbekistan, Afghan Tajiks with Tajikistan, Afghan Farsiwans (or Persians) 
with Iran, and Afghan Turkmen with Turkmenistan. Ethnicity and tribalism have often 
been the reason for splits between the Afghans.151 Consequently, Afghans have not 
developed the sense of nationhood and unity. In Afghan society, family, not the Afghan 
nation, is the single most important institution.  
 
It could be argued that tribal identity is merely one of many potential identities for the 
Afghans. Some argue that tribal identities and tribal boundaries offer only a limited 
insight into Afghanistan’s social structures; it is more important to study local conflicts, 
elites, and institutions, all of which cross tribal boundaries.152 For instance, 28 percent of 
the recorded conflicts in 2008 occurred within the family, while only 18 percent were 
conflicts between communities.153 Nevertheless, tribal identities are a reality in 
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Afghanistan and an important consideration when examining the proper form of 
government for the country.   
 
Centralized versus Decentralized Government  
 
There is a sharp division between those who believe that a decentralized government is 
the only sustainable solution and those who caution that any tribal solution in 
Afghanistan is a dangerous path and could result in further destabilization. Tribalism in 
Afghanistan has existed for centuries and Afghan tribes have traditionally resisted central 
authority. Therefore, when discussing the proper model of government in Afghanistan it 
is vital to examine the historically dysfunctional relationship between the central 
government and the tribes living outside urban areas.  
a) Centralized Government 
 
Afghanistan has historically been a centralized state with political and administrative 
powers based in Kabul. Pashtun Ahmad Shah founded today’s Afghanistan in 1747. 
Afghanistan was established as a centralized state that resembled a tribal military system. 
Amir ‘Abd al-Rahman Khan, who reigned from 1880 to 1901, further consolidated the 
governance by setting up a centralized administrative system. He successfully used the 
support from the British Empire to marginalize the tribes and increase the power of the 
state. Khan’s successors continued to promote and strengthen the central government. 
Thus, the first Afghan constitution was adopted in 1923. At the onset of the Cold War in 
the 1950s, Afghanistan experienced inflow of resources from abroad what was used by 




fell apart after the 1973 coup by Daoud Khan and the 1978 communist coup. Subsequent 
civil war resulted in anarchy. Finally, the Taliban reestablished a centralized system that 
that was dismantled by the US-led Coalition forces in November 2001.154  
After the Taliban was ousted, discussions about centralized versus decentralized 
government emerged. Even though the international community advocated a federal 
system early in the process, Afghans stood against decentralization. For Afghans, a 
decentralized state was synonymous with oppression and disintegration of their country. 
Therefore, the Constitutional Loya Jirga, a form of a mass meeting usually organized to 
discuss major events, passed the 2004 Afghan constitution establishing that Afghanistan 
is a “centralized unitary state.” 155 
A significant number of Afghan politicians and citizens initially supported strong central 
government. Afghan politicians and policymakers of various backgrounds believed that a 
strong central government would help control powerful local figures and reduce criminal 
influence. Research has shown that many Afghan citizens continue to favor a strong 
central government in hopes that it will weaken the power of war commanders who have 
been causing suffering for many years. Despite the obvious corruption within the central 
government, there is an understanding that a strong central state can neutralize local 
powerholders.156  
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Some might argue that a tribal solution in Afghanistan can be a dangerous path and could 
result in further destabilization and bring into question the survival of the state. History 
shows that even though decentralization after an internal conflict can seem like a logical 
solution, it can further aggravate ethnic hostilities and increase separatist aspirations. 157 
For instance, peace settlements following the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1990s 
included establishment of various types of decentralized governing models. In the case of 
Bosnia, the central government established by the Dayton peace agreement is weak while 
the provincial governments that are based on ethno-national criteria exert strong 
power.158 As a result, Bosnia is heavily decentralized and caught up in constant ethnic 
struggles that make any significant social or economic progress impossible.  
 
In Bosnia, there is a lack of will by some ethnic groups to remain a part of the 
independent Bosnian state. The Serbian population in Bosnia has strong ties with 
neighboring Serbia and systematically undermines the central government in Sarajevo in 
the effort to further empower the Serbian ethnic government. There are definite 
similarities between Bosnia and Afghanistan in terms of diversity, fear of ethnic 
dominance, lack of national unity, and various ethnic ties with neighboring countries. 
Bosnia is a proof that when a country emerges out of conflict heavily divided, 
decentralized systems, particularly those that are built on ethnical or tribal criteria, can be 
ineffective and paralyzing.  
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b) Decentralized Government  
 
It is plausible to argue that no centralized form of government can be successful in 
establishing firm and effective control in Afghanistan due to diversity of the Afghan 
people and the strength of tribal structures. Therefore, only a ground-up approach can 
ensure lasting security and prosperity for the Afghan people. It is important to note that 
history shows that no central government established in Afghanistan successfully reached 
the periphery and subdued the tribes. The current central government in Afghanistan has 
been inherently ineffective in providing services and security to the people living outside 
of the urban areas. For instance, while the justice system exists in urban areas, seventy 
five percent of the Afghans who live in rural areas depend on village elders, district 
governors, clerics, and police chiefs to settle disputes and provide order and security.159  
 
In Afghanistan, centralized governance has the appearance of one tribe gaining power 
over the other tribes. Democracy in Afghanistan cannot be achieved by giving power to a 
selected single tribe or a group of tribes because history suggests that it would lead to 
abuses of power.160 Provincial power figures advocate decentralization because they see 
themselves as subjects of a Pashtun-dominated government in Kabul rather than equal 
citizens of Afghanistan. 161 Many Afghans see the central government as a tool to rule the 
population and territories. There is deep distrust that the state is willing and able to 
protect the rights of all Afghans. 
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It can also be argued that decentralized government is not only a viable option but also 
the only solution that has worked in the past. Musahiban dynasty that ruled Afghanistan 
from 1929 to 1978 managed to maintain stability because the Musahibans recognized the 
importance of local authority. On the other hand, Amanullah Khan, who ruled 
Afghanistan from 1919 to 1929, failed to create a strong state. His attempt to push the 
central government into rural areas resulted in local uprisings followed by Amanullah’s 
abdication and several months of anarchy. Even today, Afghans in rural areas reject 
interfering of a strong central government into their local matters. Afghans living in 
southern and eastern Afghanistan consider the central government a foreign body. 162 
 
Case Study: Pashtun Tribes  
 
Pashtun tribes represent an appropriate case study when examining limitations to the 
influence of the central government in Kabul. Pashtun tribes are the largest ethnic group 
in Afghanistan and they have persistently rejected central authority throughout the 
Afghanistan history. The social structure of the Pashtun tribes and their full commitment 
to Pashtunwali make it almost impossible for any central government to assert its 
authority and rule these tribes. The tribes have historically rejected the idea that any other 
form of law except Pashtunwali should be enforced. The history of Afghanistan offers 
two instances that illustrate how Pashtuns respond to strong central rule. Great Britain 
and the Soviet Union both tried and failed to subdue the Pashtun tribes. Even though 
                                                 





Great Britain and the Soviet Union were occupying forces, these case studies are useful 
because Pashtuns view any external parties, including Afghan actors, as unwelcome 
interference.  
a) British Policies  
 
In order to protect the markets in British India from the Russians and preempt a likely 
Russian invasion, the British extended their influence into the Indian subcontinent’s 
North-West Frontier, an area inhabited by the Pashtun tribes. From 1849 to 1947, the 
British implemented a number of policies to bring the Pashtuns under the control of the 
British authority.163 Two policies implemented by the British, Indirect Rule and the 
Maliki System, are relevant for this discussion because they illustrate that Pashtun reject 
any external influence and value freedom and independence above any immediate gain. 
 
As British policies shifted from suppression to accommodation, they implemented 
Indirect Rule and the Maliki System. Under Indirect Rule policy the tribes were allowed 
to manage their own affairs and British administrators were to settle disputes through 
tribal custom laws. The Maliki System was established through agreements with tribal 
elders or Maliks to acknowledge British authority. The purpose of the Maliki System was 
to legitimize British authority by delegating administrative duties to tribal Maliks. The 
British would generally award good behavior by giving compensation to the Maliks or 
they would request amends for deviant behavior. 164 These actions suggest the British 
believed that certain Pashtun tribal leaders had influence over the jirgah, an assembly of 
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tribal elders called for various purposes from waging war or composing peace to 
resolving disputes. However, even though some Pashtun men did have a significant 
influence, they did not have enough power to direct the actions of the entire tribe.  
 
Pashtuns viewed Indirect Rule as the first step in conceding permanent authority to the 
British. Even in situations where the British system could have had economic benefits, 
the tribes resisted. Pashtuns have a deep mistrust of outsiders and value their 
independence more then any economic benefits. Therefore, the Pashtun tribes accepted 
British authority when it was not a threat to their independence and resisted when they 
felt that their freedom was endangered. As a result, even though these policies resulted in 
establishment of some degree of order and security on the North-West Frontier, they 
failed to establish a strong British authority.165 
b) Soviet Policies  
 
From 1979 to 1989, the Soviet Union invested a significant amount of resources to 
conquer Afghanistan and transform it into another communist state. Afghans, with the 
support of the United States and Saudi Arabia, forced the Soviets to leave in defeat.166 
The Soviet policies in Afghanistan were mostly oppressive and failed to establish any 
consequential authority. After realizing that policies designed to suppress the Afghans 
were not effective, the Soviets tried more accommodating policies.167  
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Similar to the British, the Soviets were unsuccessful in negotiating agreements with tribal 
elders. In most cases, the Pashtuns violated agreements with the Soviets as soon as it no 
longer served the tribe’s interest. Furthermore, the tribes viewed the agreements only as 
an opportunity to take weapons or money from the Soviets and felt no duty to comply 
once they achieved their goal. The Soviets tried to win over the tribes by attempting to 
“Sovietize” the rural farmers. The Soviets tired to take the land from the wealthy and give 
it to the poor. However, the farmers refused to take land from the Khans because it 
violated their social structure. The Soviets responded by threatening and eventually 
forcing many poor Pashtun farmers to accept the land.168  
 
The majority of the Afghan people saw the Soviets as aggressors. Initially, Soviet 
policies were brutal and oppressive and they violated the Pashtun sense of justice. Soviets 
eventually adopted more accommodating policies, such as Sovietization and creating a 
Soviet-Afghan army. However, the damage had been done in the initial phase of the 
occupation and the Soviets failed to gain any lasting authority over the Afghans.169 
 
Experience of the British and the Soviets offers important lessons when engaging the 
Pashtuns and these lessons can be applied to other tribes in Afghanistan as well. Both 
British and Soviets recognized that they needed to engage the Pashtuns through tribal 
leaders in order to establish security and governance. However, both failed to fully 
understand the Pashtun social structure. British and Soviets attempted to isolate one or 
several leaders who would be able to influence the decisions of the tribe. Pashtun tribes, 
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as well as other tribes in Afghanistan, do not have a hierarchical structure and there is no 
one person with whom to negotiate. The social structure of the tribes in Afghanistan 
easily changes under external pressure. 170  
 
It is clear that the commitment to Pashtunwali and preservation of freedom and 
independence are paramount for the Pashtuns. It is not likely that this will change and 
that Pashtuns, or any other tribe with a strong social structure, will allow the current 
Kabul government to rule them. Therefore, it is vital to engage the tribes in a way that 
corresponds to their social organization. In order to establish security and gain 
cooperation of the tribes, the government in Kabul, as well as the international 
community, should engage the tribes based on their customary social organization. 
 
Security Solution on the Local Level: Arbakai Networks  
 
Security has been the main concern of the Afghan people since 2001. Despite a long 
history of various forms of central government in Kabul not being able to provide 
security to the remote rural areas, the only force that is expected to maintain security 
gains achieved over the past decade is the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), a 
national security force that includes armed forces and police. Recent Afghanistan report 
published by the U.S. Department of Defense warns that, despite ANSF making 
significant achievements in recent years, the security gains could be lost after the United 
States troops leave the country. While the Afghanistan National Army (ANA) is for the 
most part staffed, operational, and slowly gaining confidence of the Afghan people, the 
                                                 




police forces remain understaffed, untrained, and ineffective. 171 The Afghanistan 
National Police (ANP) has failed to develop necessary capabilities to assume 
responsibility at the end of 2014.172 News agencies on the ground report that a significant 
number of ANP members, up to thirty percent, are drug addicts. Additionally, ANP is 
frequently infiltrated by secret Taliban agents.173 Additionally, the Afghan Border Police 
(ABP) is also ineffective and far from being self-sufficient. 174  
 
Decentralization could provide an alternative on the local level to the dysfunctional ANP 
and ABP forces. The government in Kabul could utilize Arbakai networks as 
peacekeepers and border patrols. Arbakai networks have a potential to improve security 
by encouraging the people living in rural areas to take charge of their own security. 
Arbakai is a traditional system of village armed forces that defend communities and 
enforce decisions of tribal councils called the Jirgas. Arbakai networks have a long 
tradition in Loya Paktia province due to the mountainous terrain of the southeastern 
region that makes it difficult for central governments to assert their influence. 
Additionally, warlords do not dominate the southeastern region whereas tribal leaders 
still maintain a strong influence.175 
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The idea of the Arbakai assisting the central state is not a novel idea. The Arbakai have 
been known to send their people to support the central government. For instance, during 
the time of the Kingdom of Abdul Rahman, from 1873 to 1897, the tribes were asked to 
help central government by sending their people to fight. Furthermore, there is a system 
in place called Hasht Nafari’ or Ashna Pari that facilitates this transfer of the Arbakai 
forces to assist the central government.176 
 
The word “arbakai” translated from Pashto means “messenger.” The Arbakai are very 
different from militias. In southeast Afghanistan being an Arbakai member is considered 
an honor while belonging to a militia is considered shameful. The Arbakai are not for hire 
and they are unpaid. Typical responsibilities of the Arbakai are to (1) implement the 
Jirga’s decisions, (2) maintain law and order, and (3) protect and defend borders of a tribe 
or a community. Border security has been historically a core task of the Arbakai and they 
have been very effective in this role. For instance, people from the southeast region Loya 
Paktia were not obliged to undertake two years of military service as a reward for their 
effectiveness as border keepers.177  
 
Arbakai system exemplifies how certain tribal structures can provide accountability and 
transparency, characteristics that the central government in Kabul is currently lacking. 
There is a clear division of responsibilities between the Jirga as the decision making 
authority and the Arbakai as the enforcement mechanism. The Jirga has the power to 
make decisions and authorize the Arbakai. On the other hand, the Arbakai have the power 






to implement, but not to change Jirga decisions. This distinction of responsibilities makes 
it easy for the Jirga and the people to monitor the Arbakai. The Arbakai are accountable 
to the Jirga and the Jirga has the authority to manage and suspend the Arbakai. 
Transparency is guaranteed because the Jirga is a collective decision making body.178  
 
Some analysts state that Arbakai networks are unreliable and arming them will lead to 
further destabilization and creation of new warlords. In June 2006, Afganistan’s President 
Hamid Karzai authorized the Arbakai in eastern Afghanistan to help in local policing. 
Karzai argued that the Arbakai provide security and are loyal to the central government. 
He stated that arming the Arbakai was not inconsistent with the disarmament 
programs.179 However, Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid stated at the time that Karzai's 
move was a setback in the efforts to strengthen the central government and predicted that 
arming Pashtun “militias” in the south would renew tribal rivalries. General Nur-al Haq 
Olumi, a member of parliament from Kandahar Province, stated that arming the Arbakai 
in the south while supporting national efforts to disperse and disarm militias was 
contradictory and potentially destructive. He claimed that this would result in the 
emergence of new warlords.180  
 
The more recent Afghan history shows that Arbakai networks can be successfully 
introduced in places where they currently do not exist. The Governor of Kunar Province 
established an Arbakai network in 2004 and based it on the long-standing Arbakai system 
of the Shinwari, Mohmand, and Khogyani tribes. In the 1960s and 1970s, the central 
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government engaged these tribes to provide border protection and prevent potential 
interference from Pakistan. To cover the expenses incurred by the tribes for providing 
border protection, the central government turned over a portion of state-owned irrigated 
lands to the Jirgas. Using the same model, the Arbakai system in Kunar Province was 
financed by the central government through the Jirga and not through direct payment to 
the Arbakai. This distinction is very important as it preserved the accountability and 
transparency mechanisms. Additionally, giving compensation to the Arbakai directly 
would in effect transform them into militia and create opportunities for corruption. The 
Arbakai in Kunar province had success in maintaining the security of development 
projects and on the main roads.181  
 
It is important to note that in the case of Agab district of Kapisa province, located north 
of Kabul, the implementation of Arbakai system was unsuccessful. However, the failure 
is the result of poor design and implementation rather than a reflection of the true value 
of the Arbakai.  The individuals who were entrusted with the implementation and 
management of the system were former combatants related to jihadist parties rather than 
legitimate representatives of the local population. They were included in the project 
because of their political affiliations. These individuals were responsible for selecting 
people who would be armed and assist the government in providing security. However, 
the Arbakai themselves were often attacked by the insurgents, which, understandably, did 
not provoke a reaction from the local population. The principal reason for the failure of 
this particular Arbakai system is the fact that it was implemented through a top-down 
approach. It was created to achieve political and financial goals of certain individuals. 
                                                 




Arbakai system can function only if it is built through a bottom-up approach and 
embedded in the local structures that the people know and trust.182 
 
Is Current Centralized Model Working for Afghanistan?  
  
Even with the strong support from the United States over the years, the current 
government in Kabul, often labeled the “Karzai’s government” to illustrate the fact that 
all government officials are handpicked by President Hamid Karzai, remains ineffective 
and unable to reach out to all of its citizens. The central government in Kabul is 
perceived as weak, corrupt, and unable to meet the needs of the Afghan people. The lack 
of cooperation between national and subnational levels of the government, which can be 
viewed as a direct result of virtually all power being centered in Kabul, hinders access of 
the Afghan people to public services. Government services have yet to reach the Afghans 
in rural areas. The subnational government representatives, members of local and 
provincial councils, even though they are to be elected at the subnational level and serve 
among their constituents, do not have clearly defined roles and powers. Provincial and 
district governors are directly appointed by Kabul and contribute to the ineffectiveness of 
the local government structures.183  
 
The government in Kabul appears to have recognized the importance of delegating some 
of its authority to local structures and has shown signs that it is moving away from a 
strictly centralized model. In March 2010, President Karzai approved a new governance 
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policy that transfers some administrative and budgetary powers to subnational bodies, 
namely institutions at provincial, district, and municipal levels.184  
 
However, without a continued support from the outside for whichever government model 
the Afghans choose in the end, the sustainability of the Afghan state will be brought into 
question. Afghanistan is presently going through a stage often described as a transitional 
stage of the nation building process. This is the stage when a state emerging from conflict 
is sovereign but still too weak and riddled with corruption to be self-sustainable.185  
Afghanistan will need the support and resources from Washington for decades to come. 
Therefore, it is important to discuss whether the United States policy towards 
Afghanistan and the actions of the Afghan government have been moving in the same 
direction.  
 
In the early stages of nation building in Afghanistan, policy makers in Washington 
dismissed a ground-up strategy. On the other hand, American allies like the British and 
Dutch have been pushing to engage tribal elements from some time. British Prime 
Minister Gordon Brown suggested in December 2007 that international forces should 
increase their support for Arbakai networks in southeast Afghanistan. The idea was given 
little credibility by American counterparts at the time. American General Dan McNeill, 
commander of the NATO forces at the time, called it potentially disastrous.186 The Dutch 
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also favor building relationships with tribal leaders. Instead of combating the Taliban, 
Dutch forces in Uruzgan focused on identifying reconstruction priorities in cooperation 
with the local leadership. The Dutch consider this approach to be the key to a long-term 
conciliation.187 
 
The turning point for the U.S. policy makers was the rise in violence in 2006. The events 
in 2006 made it clear that Kabul was not making progress in establishing control of the 
rural areas. There was a noticeable reversal in the official U.S. policy in 2008 when high-
level officials started publicly discussing engaging tribal elements. Defense Secretary 
Robert M. Gates said in October 2008 that he favored some form of reconciliation in 
Afghanistan. Shortly after that statement and during a speech at the U.S. Institute for 
Peace in Washington, Gates was explicit in his support of engaging tribal elements. 
Defense Secretary Gates stated that, "At the end of the day the only solution in 
Afghanistan is to work with the tribes and provincial leaders in terms of trying to create a 
backlash ... against the Taliban."188 In November 2008, General David McKiernan, top 
commander of NATO and US forces in Afghanistan at the time, recommended giving 
more power to local councils to stem violence in the country. McKiernan added that such 
approach would have multiple benefits. It would allow the Afghan government in Kabul 
to empower these committees so they can provide local security and oversight. At the 
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same time, it would allow the central government to benefit from the insight of 
community leaders.189 
 
On December 1, 2009, President Obama, in a speech held at West Point, revealed his 
much anticipated Afghanistan strategy for the first time after taking office. President 
Obama's remarks made it clear that the United States government gave up on building a 
highly central government in Afghanistan. President Obama opened the possibility of 
working with local leaders where they can be more effective partners.190 He stated that, 
“We'll support Afghan ministries, governors, and local leaders that combat corruption 
and deliver for the people.“191 The commitment of the Obama Administration to work 
with local authorities when viable is a continuation of the effort to build up local 
governance started at the end of the Bush administration. In 2008, before leaving the 
office, President Bush attempted to revive tribal structures, such as the traditional local 
advisory councils known as “jirgas” and “shuras,” which play an important role in 
providing justice outside of urban centers. 192 The U.S. State Department’s Afghanistan 
and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy published in January 2010 reflects the 
continuation of the efforts to build up local structures. It states that, “Improving the 
Afghan people’s confidence in their government requires improved service delivery, 
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greater accountability, and more protection from predatory government practices, 
particularly at the district and community level, where the Taliban is providing its own 
brand of brutal but efficient governance.”193 
 
Continued efforts to strengthen the subnational government by relying on the existing 
local structures have resulted in improved governance in rural areas. For instance, the 
Community Development Councils (CDCs), subnational government structures presently 
elected by the members in rural communities, have proven successful in the area of 
economic development. CDCs have been successful in securing international financing 
for small-scale development projects as well as providing other government services, 
such as conflict resolution. In areas where CDCs lack capacity, they are willing to engage 
traditional forms of government such as shura. Surveys indicate that Afghans in rural 





The issue of centralization versus decentralization is not a simple issue in Afghanistan. 
Tribalism and local governance in Afghanistan are a reality and history shows that no 
central authority has managed to subdue tribal loyalties. Current central government in 
Kabul has a short reach, lacks credibility, and is unlikely to provide security to the 
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Afghan people after the U.S. troops leave the country. It appears that some parts of the 
Afghan government, including President Karzai, do not see a strictly centralized 
government as a sustainable solution. The international community, headed by the United 
States, has moved away from building a strongly centralized government and towards 
empowering subnational government structures. 
 
It is clear that that the central government has to allow for delegation of certain powers to 
provinces and districts. That will increase the credibility of the central government and 
reduce abuse and corruption. Tribal leaders and other local actors can be invaluable 
partners and they are the key to establishing much needed security and order. Local 
leaders in Afghanistan understand their community needs and should be supported by the 
central government as well as the international community. However, the success of 
cooperation with the tribes will depend, as illustrated in the case study of the Pashtun 
tribes, on the government’s willingness to engage the tribes in a way that will respect 
their existing social structure and their commitment to some degree of independence. 
 
While there are areas like military and taxation that should stay under the central 
government, security and border control is one area where local structures can benefit the 
central government. The Arbakai could be used as peacekeepers and border patrols. The 
concept could be introduced in the parts of the country where Arbakai networks currently 
do not exist. When implementing the Arbakai system it is important to preserve the 




Arbakai can be successful only if they have full support of both the Afghan government 
and the international community.  
 
In rural areas where tribal structures are strong and central governments have been 
traditionally viewed as oppressors, Kabul should attempt to increase its reach and 
credibility by continuing efforts to engage traditional tribal structures. For instance, 
informal justice systems, such as “shura” structures, which have existed in Afghanistan 
for centuries and are currently the main and most effective forums for settling disputes, 
should continue to be incorporated into the formal justice system wherever possible. 
However, there is no doubt that these informal systems have to undergo certain changes 
to ensure equality and fairness.  
 
As the much-anticipated 2014 elections are approaching and the United States is set to 
withdraw most of its forces by the end of the year, Afghanistan is facing a future with no 
guarantees for the long-term sustainability of its fragile government. However, building a 
sustainable and self-reliant Afghan state is not an impossible task. Research shows that 
many Afghans today want to participate in their government as citizens of Afghanistan 
but they have different notions as to what that actually means.195 They deserve a 
government that is effective and accountable. It is very likely that Afghanistan will 
eventually move towards a more decentralized model and determining the proper level of 
decentralization will be a complex task. In the interim, the United States and the rest of 
the international community should continue assisting the Afghans in constructing a 
                                                 
 




government that is centralized enough to unite the country and decentralized enough to 









Despite its extensive nation building experience prior to 9/11 the United States appeared 
unprepared for the missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. The beginning of the nation 
building efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq can be described as amateurish and badly 
conceived. This should come as no surprise considering that the U.S. anti-terrorism 
strategy in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 was designed to achieve regime changes by 
the use of military force while at the same time avoiding protracted nation building 
engagements. However, shortly after declaring a military victory in Afghanistan and Iraq 
it became clear that without rebuilding the Afghan and Iraqi societies it would be 
impossible to secure a lasting victory against terrorists.  
 
The arguments that support the claim that terrorism is not a concern in the majority of 
failed states presented in this thesis are valid and convincing. However, the examples of 
Afghanistan and Somalia presented in Chapter 1 illustrate that failed states offer 
important opportunities for terrorist networks. In the case of Afghanistan prior to the U.S. 
invasion, the absence of a functioning government enabled al Qaeda to establish a 
stronghold and plan attacks on the U.S. homeland. Present Somalia is an example of how 
corrupt government structures in a failing state can be used by terrorists to freely move 
their people and materials. Therefore, it is plausible to argue that there will likely be 
instances in the next few decades when failing and weak states will jeopardize global 





In the absence of an interagency nation building structure, the U.S. military was asked to 
take the lead in the post 9/11 missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. The military had a 
difficult task – leading democratization efforts and economic recovery while at the same 
time performing its principal task of maintaining security. The Iraq case study offered in 
Chapter 2 illustrates that the tasks the military was asked to lead–building government 
structures, reconciling warring factions, and addressing high unemployment–are clearly 
beyond traditional military training. Securing lasting success in the area of 
democratization and economy is an overwhelming task even for the world’s greatest 
military. It is clear that if the military continues to be the lead in nation building efforts, 
not because it is the best tool but the only available tool, it could be perceived abroad as 
the main diplomatic instrument of the American foreign policy. This would clearly put 
American foreign policy goals at risk. It would say to the world that the United States 
considers the military to be more effective than civilian government. Asking the military 
to develop capabilities necessary to lead democratization and economic projects has a 
potential of diminishing its ability to defend homeland and win conventional wars.  
 
The mission in Afghanistan exemplifies the difficulties of nation building as an anti-
terrorism strategy. Nation building in Afghanistan has lasted for over a decade and 
resulted in a high number of casualties, both American and Afghan, and an enormous 
cost. As the U.S. military is set to withdraw by the end of 2014, it is not clear if the new 
and fragile Afghan state will be able to stop resurgence of the Taliban. This thesis 
maintains that transforming a post-conflict society into a sustainable democracy is not an 




However, only a strategy that takes into account the history of the host country and 
identifies common interests of the warring factions can result in a success. It is also 
important to note that there is no “one size fits all” solution in terms of governance in 
post-conflict countries. As discussed in Chapter 3, the decentralized model in Bosnia 
envisioned by the Dayton Agreement continued nationalistic divide and made any real 
progress difficult. On the other hand, a centralized state model may not be sustainable in 
Afghanistan. Tribalism and local governance in Afghanistan are a reality. The current 
central government in Kabul has a short reach, lacks credibility, and is unlikely to 
provide security to the Afghan people after the U.S. troops leave the country.  
 
The United States has to be able to build a state-centric approach to nation building. In 
the case of Afghanistan, this thesis upholds that the best constitutional framework is a 
unitary state that is structured in a way that will enable participation of traditional local 
structures. The central government needs to concede some of its power to provinces and 
districts. It is very likely that Afghanistan will eventually move towards a more 
decentralized model. Continued long-term support by the United States and the rest of the 
international community will be critical in ensuring sustainability of whichever 
government model the Afghans choose. 
 
It is easy to understand why nation building is no policy maker’s preferred strategy – it is 
costly, requires a long commitment even after the military troops leave the host country, 
and comes with no guarantees for success. Precisely for these reasons, the United States 




policy and national security strategy. As a result, there has been no serious effort to 
consolidate knowledge from past missions and develop a nation building apparatus that 
could be deployed in future missions.  
 
We are likely to face additional state failures in the next several decades that will pose a 
global security threat. The United States, as the only remaining world power, will be 
called to take the lead. Past experience shows that any intervention in a failed state, in 
order to have a lasting success, will have to include some level of nation building. 
However, that reality is not easily accepted among the policy makers in Washington.  
Those who propose reexamining and fixing the nation building system are in the 
minority.  
 
This thesis recognizes some ongoing efforts to design a proper approach to nation 
building. One effort that is worth mentioning is building a “whole government” approach. 
This effort is predicated on a strong relationship between the military and civilian 
agencies in both planning and execution. However, it is clear that even though some 
progress has been made in building an effective interagency structure, such as the 
establishment of the Civilian Response Corps, there is a lot more work to be done.  
 
After Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States is faced with a choice – whether to 
consolidate lessons from past missions and build an effective nation building apparatus or 
do nothing and face another crisis unprepared. The United States will first have to accept 




conflict states. The next step is developing a nation building model that will effectively 
utilize all available resources. The United States cannot continue to rely on its military in 
all aspects of nation building simply because there is no other viable option. The time to 
start learning from past missions and initiate a reform that will result in an effective 
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